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TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY OF THE JURISDICTION
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS*
Thomas E. Baker**
I. INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND, AND OVERVIEW
A. Purpose
A unified theory is one which explains a phenomenon once and for all.
A grand unified theory of the universe, for example, would explain its origin
and its end, and everything in between. My reader should take an immediate
cue from my title that I mean this Article only as a preliminary step towards
a unified theory of the jurisdiction of the United States Courts of Appeals.
My purpose then is to provide an introduction to the complexities and
nuances within the subject matter jurisdiction of the United States Courts
of Appeals. This Article is organized into seven parts. Part I provides a
brief introduction, background, and overview. Part II canvasses the proce-
dures related to the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction. The discussion
of civil appeals is divided into two parts: Part III deals with appeals from
final judgments and Part IV deals with interlocutory appeals. Extraordinary
writs are covered in Part V. Criminal appeals are the subject of Part VI.
Part VII summarizes appellate review of the decisions of federal administra-
tive agencies.
B. A Brief History of the Courts of Appeals
Any study of the federal courts or their jurisdiction must begin with a
historical perspective.' More particularly, the major historical stages of the
federal court system have been reflected in the creation and the reforms of
* This Article is a product of a study undertaken in furtherance of the Federal Judicial
Center's statutory mission to conduct and stimulate research and development on matters of
judicial administration. The analysis, conclusions, and points of view are those of the author.
On matters of policy, the Center speaks only through its Board. The full monograph, entitled,
A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U. S. COURTS OF APPEALS, is available from the Federal
Judicial Center.
** Professor of Law, Texas Tech University; B.S., cum laude, 1974, Florida State Uni-
versity; J.D., with high honors, 1977, University of Florida.
The author gratefully acknowledges the support of a research grant from the Texas Tech
University School of Law which enabled this adaptation. The research assistance of the De
Paul Law Review likewise is gratefully appreciated.
1. See generally E. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (1987).
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the middle tier.2 Article III of the Constitution vests the federal judicial
power "in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish." 3 The original statute, the
Judiciary Act of 1789,4 provided for two tiers of courts subordinate to the
Supreme Court. On the one hand, the district courts were exclusively trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.5 The circuit courts, on the other hand, were
the principal trial courts with original jurisdiction over more serious criminal
offenses, diversity suits above a set figure, and cases in which the United
States was a party. 6 Although the Supreme Court was the principal appellate
court, the circuit courts also had some appellate jurisdiction to review
specified categories of district court decisions. 7 The circuits were arranged
geographically and had no judges of their own, rather, two Supreme Court
justices "rode circuit" to sit with a district judge as a panel.' Soon after-
wards, Congress reconstituted the circuit courts so as to require a panel of
one justice and one district judge in order to lessen the travel burden on the
justices .9
The famous, though short-lived, "Midnight Judges" Act'0 in 1801 would
have created circuit judgeships and three-judge panels for each of the newly-
numbered six circuits." In response to this alleged early Federalist effort at
2. Baker, Precedent Times Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 35 Sw. L.J.
687, 688 (1981) (tracing the historical development of the federal courts of appeal as a
background for discussion of the fifth circuit).
3. U.S. CoNsT. art. IIl, § I.
4. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
5. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (provided that district courts'
exclusive jurisdiction was limited, for example, to jurisdiction over minor crimes, civil causes
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, seizures of land, et cetera).
6. Id. § 11, at 78-79 (circuit courts had original jurisdiction where the matter in controversy
exceeded $500.00).
7. Id. § 11, at 79.
8. Id. § 4, at 74.
9. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 333 (providing that the attendance of one justice
was sufficient except in certain cases).
10. Act of February 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89, repealed by Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 31,
2 Stat. 156.
11. The "Midnight Judges" Act provided in pertinent part:
The said districts shall be classed into six circuits in manner following .... The
first circuit shall consist of the districts of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts
and Rhode Island; the second, of the districts of Connecticut, Vermont, Albany
and new York; the third, of the districts of Jersey, the Eastern and Western districts
of Pennsylvania and Delaware; the fourth, of the districts of Maryland, and the
Eastern and Western districts of Virginia; the fifth, of the districts of North
Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia; and the sixth, of the districts of Eastern
Tennessee, Western Tennessee, Kentucky and Ohio.
Id. § 6, at 90.
The statute further provided: "[Tihat there shall be in each of the aforesaid circuits, except
the sixth circuit, three judges of the United States to be called circuit judges, one of whom
shall be commissioned as chief judge .... Id. For additional discussion of this act, see
Turner, The Midnight Judges, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 494 (1961).
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"court-packing," the successor Jeffersonian Congress repealed the 1801 Act
and returned the circuit courts to the status quo ante, except that their
quorum was further reduced to require one district judge sitting alone.1 2
For a time, congressional attention focused only on the geography of the
courts. The technical duty of riding circuit continued for the justices, which
obliged Congress to add to the membership of the Supreme Court in order
to accommodate western expansion and the creation of new circuits. There-
fore, a seventh circuit and a seventh justice were added in 1807.1 For a
time, Congress resisted increasing the size of the Supreme Court by simply
not bringing new states into the circuits. 4 By 1837, however, pent-up demand
resulted in the addition of a ninth justice with a concomitant redrawing of
circuit lines to create nine judicial circuits. 5 Not long thereafter, Congress
added a tenth circuit which included the west coast states, and a tenth justice
was added to the Supreme Court.'" In 1862 and in 1866, Congress again
rearranged the circuits, finally settling on nine circuits. 17 In 1869, for the
12. Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 4, 2 Stat. 156, 157 (redefined the six circuits and
returned to the old circuit system, where two circuit courts were to be held within each district),
as amended by Act of March 3, 1803, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 244. See H. HART, P. BATOR, D. SHmPRO,
D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 38 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (discussing the new Act
of April 29, 1802).
13. Act of February 24, 1807, ch. 16, 2 Stat. 420 (provided that the districts of Kentucky,
Tennessee and Ohio shall constitute the seventh circuit), as amended by Act of March 22, 1808,
ch. 38, 2 Stat. 477, and Act of February 4, 1809, ch. 14, 2 Stat. 516 (amendments divided
Tennessee into two districts for the purpose of holding circuit courts). See HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 12, at 36.
14. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BuSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT, A STUDY IN
THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1928) (as of 1831, one-fourth of the states in the Union did
not participate in the benefits of a circuit court). See also Baker, supra note 2, at 691 n.34,
736 (prior to the Act of March 3, 1837, eight states had been excluded from the circuit court
system, including Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi and
Missouri).
15. Act of March 3, 1837, ch. 34, 5 Stat. 176. This act provided that "[tihe Supreme Court
shall consist of a chief justice, and eight associate judges, any five of whom shall constitute a
quorum." In addition, the act redrew the boundaries to accommodate nine circuits, as follows.
The second circuit consisted of the districts of Vermont, Connecticut and New York; the third-
the districts of New Jersey, and the eastern and western districts of Pennsylvania; the fourth-
the districts of Maryland and Delaware; the fifth-the districts of Virginia and North Carolina;
the sixth-the districts of South Carolina and Georgia; the seventh-the districts of Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois and Michigan; the eighth-the districts of Kentucky, east and west Tennessee,
and Missouri; and the ninth-the districts of Alabama, the eastern district of Louisiana, and
the districts of Mississippi and Arkansas. Id. § 1, at 176-77.
16. Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 142, 10 Stat. 631; Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 100, 12 Stat.
794, as amended by Act of February 19, 1864, ch. 11, 13 Stat. 4 (provided that "the supreme
court of the United States shall hereafter consist of a chief justice and nine associate justices,
any six of whom shall constitute a quorum; . . . [and] [t]he districts of California and Oregon
shall constitute the tenth circuit"; repealing that portion of the Act of March 2, 1855 that
established a circuit court of the United States in the State of California).
17. Act of July 15, 1862, ch. 178, 12 Stat. 576 (redrew the circuits along new geographical
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first time, Congress created one judgeship for each circuit and further reduced
the justices' circuit-riding responsibility.'
In the period between 1870 and 1891, federal court litigation increased
dramatically, as a result of geographical expansion, population growth,
commercial development and congressional extensions of jurisdiction. 9 When
House and Senate reformers could not agree on how to respond they did
nothing, and the courts were hard-pressed to keep up with their work.2 0 The
country had become too large for circuit-riding to be a feasible duty for the
justices. Moreover, a complement of only ten circuit judges2' could not
realistically supervise the growing number of district courts, which by then
had reached sixty-five districts. 22 Consequently, an appeal from a district
court decision to a circuit court panel comprised of the one district judge
was viewed realistically as a waste of time. Furthermore, appeals from the
circuit court to the Supreme Court were almost eliminated, as well, by
statute.
23
lines, so that the fourth circuit included the districts of Maryland, Delaware, Virginia and
North Carolina; the fifth circuit contained the districts of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama,
Mississippi and Florida; the sixth circuit contained the districts of Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas,
Kentucky and Tennessee; the seventh circuit contained the districts of Ohio and Indiana; the
eighth circuit contained the districts of Michigan, Wisconsin and Illinois and the ninth circuit
contained the districts of Missouri, Iowa, Kansas and Minnesota); Act of July 23, 1866, ch.
210, 14 Stat. 209 (redrew the circuits (with the exception of the first and second circuits) along
new geographical lines to make the following changes: the third circuit included the districts of
Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware; the fourth included the districts of Maryland, West
Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina; the fifth included the districts of Georgia,
Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas; the sixth included the districts of Ohio,
Michigan, Kentucky and Tennessee; the seventh included the districts of Indiana, Illinois and
Wisconsin, the eighth included the districts of Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas and Arkansas; and the
ninth included the districts California, Oregon and Nevada). The Act of July 23, 1866 also
reduced the Supreme Court to six associates and one Chief Justice, any four of whom constituted
a quorum. This change lasted until the Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44, when the
Supreme Court was restored to nine.
18. Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44. This Act returned the number of Supreme
Court justices to nine; one "Chief Justice of the United States and eight associate justices, any
six of whom shall constitute a quorum." In addition, Congress appointed a circuit judge for
each of the nine existing circuits "who shall reside in his circuit, and shall possess the same
power and jurisdiction therein as the justice of the Supreme Court allotted to the circuit." Id.
19. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 36-37 (for discussion of geographical expan-
sion).
20. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 14, at 60 (citing Rep. of Att'y Gen. for
1890 (noting that from 1870 to 1890, the number of cases pending in the circuit and district
courts nearly doubled)).
21. In 1887, a tenth circuit judge was added to sit in the second circuit. Act of March 3,
1887, ch. 347, 24 Stat. 492.
22. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 14, at 87.
23. See 12 J. MOORE, H. BENDIX & B. RINGLE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 400.06 [8.-
7] (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter 12 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE] (discusses stages of statutory
elimination of direct appeal to the Supreme Court); E. CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §
1.4 (1989) (discussing changes in Supreme Court jurisdiction, particularly increases in both
jurisdiction and discretion). For a comprehensive discussion of Supreme Court review, see id.
ch. 10, §§ 10.1-10.5.
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With the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891,24 commonly known as
the Evarts Act, Congress made a long overdue structural change that marked
the modern organization of the federal courts. 25 The 1891 Act created a
circuit court of appeals for each circuit composed of two circuit judges (a
second judgeship was created in each circuit) and either one circuit justice
or one district judge.26 The old circuit courts continued as trial courts, but
their appellate jurisdiction was transferred to the newly-created circuit courts
of appeals. 27 A second appeal as of right to the Supreme Court from the
circuit court of appeals was limited both by subject matter and by an amount
in controversy requirement. 28 In the remaining cases, the circuit court of
appeals' decision was final, subject only to discretionary review by the
Supreme Court either by a writ of certiorari or by certification. 29 The
structure was further streamlined in 1911, when the by-then anachronistic
circuit courts were abolished and their trial jurisdiction was transferred to
24. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
25. E. SURRENCY, supra note 1, at 245 (establishment of the circuit courts of appeals relieved
the Supreme Court docket).
26. The Act of March 3, 1891, provided in pertinent part:
[T]here shall be appointed by the President of the United States, by and with the
consent of the Senate, in each circuit an additional circuit judge, who shall have
the same qualifications, and shall have the same power and jurisdiction therein that
the circuit judges of the United States, within their respective circuits, now have
Sac. 2 That there is hereby created in each circuit a circuit court of appeals, which
shall consist of three judges, of whom two shall constitute a quorum and which
shall be a court of record with appellate jurisdiction ....
SEC. 3 That the Chief-Justice and the associate justices of the Supreme Court
assigned to each circuit, and the circuit judges within each circuit, and the several
district judges within each circuit, shall be competent to sit as judges of the circuit
court of appeals ....
In case the full court at any time shall not be made up by the attendance of the
Chief-Justice or an associate justice of the Supreme Court and circuit judges, one
or more district judges within the circuit shall be competent to sit in the court ....
Provided, that no justice or judge before whom a cause or question may have
been tried or heard in a district court, or existing court, shall sit on the trial or
hearing of such cause in question in the circuit court of appeals.
Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (emphasis in original).
27. The Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 4, 26 Stat. 826, 827, eliminated the appellate
jurisdiction of the old circuit courts. However, the statute did not expressly remove the existing
circuit courts' original jurisdiction, which remained until the courts were abolished by the
Judiciary Act of 1911. Originally, the first circuit courts had original jurisdiction over all
matters not expressly reserved for the district courts. See Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20,
§ 9, 1 Stat. 73. This Act gave the district courts exclusive jurisdiction in admiralty cases, minor
criminal offenses, and other limited areas. The circuit courts, then, had original jurisdiction
over all other matters, until 1911. See infra note 30.
28. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 827, 828. This section limited appeals as
of right to the Supreme Court from the circuit courts of appeals to matters where the amount
in controversy exceeded one thousand dollars. The subject matter was limited to "all cases not
hereinbefore, in this section, made final.
29. Id.
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the district courts.30 In 1925, Congress dramatically expanded the Supreme
Court's discretion over its docket.3 Thus, the modern structure contemplates
that the district courts shall conduct initial trials, the courts of appeals shall
hear appeals as of right, and the Supreme Court shall enjoy the discretionary
final review.
The federal court system has not evolved much beyond its 1911 structure,
with the exception of new geographical lines.32 In the 1948 Judicial Code,
the circuit courts of appeals were renamed the courts of appeals for the
various circuits.33 Congress added a tenth circuit in 1929,14 an eleventh circuit
in 1981, 31 and created the Federal Circuit in 1982.36 Of course, one of the
30. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, Pub. L. No. 61-475, 36 Stat. 1087. The 1911 Act
codified, revised, and amended the laws relating to the judiciary. It redrew the old court system
and left the old circuits out, effectively abolishing them. In addition, it focused on the newly-
revised district courts, giving them extensive original jurisdiction. Section 24 contains the
jurisdictional grant, extending to:
[AII suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, brought by the United
States, or by any officer thereof authorized by law to sue, or between citizens of
the same State claiming lands under grants from different States; or, where the
matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of
three thousand dollars, and (a) arises under the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or treaties made, or such shall be made, under their authority, or (b) is
between citizens of different States, or (c) is between citizens of a State and foreign
States, citizens or subjects ....
Id. The statute excepted a long list of cases from the value requirement. For example, criminal
cases, cases arising under slave trade laws, postal suits and civil rights suits did not need to
meet the value requirement. See also Textile Mills Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 329
(1941) (noting that the Judicial Code, Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, § 297,
abolished the existing circuit courts).
31. Act of February 13, 1925, ch. 229, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936. Before this Act,
any circuit court decision not made final could be taken to the Supreme Court on writ of
appeal or error, with review nearly mandatory. See E. SURRENCY, supra note 1, at 252. After
this Act, "except for areas where Congress mandated an appeal to the Supreme Court, the
[court of appeals] became the final appellate court unless the Supreme Court decided in its
discretion to issue certiorari to review a case. . . . This bill established the Supreme Court as a
court to determine policy questions of national concern." Id.
32. See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
33. Judicial Code of 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 43(a) (1982).
34. Act of February 28, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-840, 45 Stat. 1346. This act provided for
ten judicial circuits, constituted as follows: the first circuit included the districts of Rhode
Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine and Puerto Rico; the second-the districts of
Vermont, Connecticut and New York; the third-the districts of Pennsylvania, New Jersey &
Delaware; the fourth-the districts of Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina and
South Carolina; the fifth-the districts of Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana
and Texas; the sixth-the districts of Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky and Tennessee; the seventh-
the districts of Indiana, Illinois and Wisconsin; the eighth-the districts of Minnesota, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, Arkansas, Nebraska and Missouri; the ninth-the districts of
California, Oregon, Nevada, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Hawaii and Arizona; the tenth-
the districts of Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, Kansas, Oklahoma and New Mexico.
35. Act of October 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994. This Act split the fifth
circuit as follows. The new fifth circuit included the District of the Canal Zone, Louisiana,
Mississippi and Texas. The new eleventh circuit included Alabama, Florida and Georgia.
36. Act of April 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
240 [Vol. 39:235
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most currently controverted issues is whether the nearly one hundred year
old structure is adequately serving the nation's needs or whether a new
national court system should be created.1
7
Two lessons relevant here may be gleaned from this brief historical account.
First, the evolution of our federal court structure demonstrates a congres-
sional preoccupation with the middle tier-today the courts of appeals for
the various circuits. Their jurisdiction significantly regulates the flow of cases
up to the Supreme Court and at the same time allows for the direct
supervision of the district courts. Second, an understanding of the historical
function of the intermediate court can shed light on their current jurisdiction.
For example, the circuit courts were originally both trial and appellate
tribunals. As a consequence, some aspects of each function remain. Their
position in the middle orients them simultaneously toward the high Court
and the trial court. Until recently, their function was understood to be to
correct errors, and it was deemed to be the function of the Supreme Court
to declare law and to achieve uniformity." Docket growth, however, has
rendered the courts of appeals more autonomous in the federal hierarchy. 39
Consequently, their final power to declare law has grown. Subject matter
jurisdiction-the judicial power-cannot be understood in the abstract or
without some appreciation for role or function.4 0
C. Limited Jurisdiction
At the outset, it merits special reiteration: "It is a principle of first
importance that the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." 4' Thus,
37. Compare, e.g., Baker & McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100 HARv.
L. REV. 1400, 1408 (1987) (favoring a new national court of appeals and criticizing the current
"percolation" of conflicts) with Ginsburg & Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARv. L.
REV. 1417 (1987) (arguing against a new national court of appeals and that the "percolation"
approach allows the Supreme Court to provide better reasoned opinions).
38. See Baker & McFarland, supra note 37, at 1405 (discussing the respective functions of
the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court).
39. Id. "During the last 25 years, appeals to the courts of appeals have increased ninefold;
a caseload of 3,713 in 1960 grew to 33,360 in 1985." See DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1960 ANNUAL REPORT 2; DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT 2. As a result of this
growth, the Supreme Court's power to achieve uniformity is greatly diminished.
40. See generally Carrington, The Power of District Judges and the Responsibility of Courts
of Appeals, 3 GA. L. REV. 507 (1969) (favors appellate review); Wright, The Doubtful Omnis-
cience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 752 (1957) (arguing that appellate courts
have created new procedural devices to gain more control; in particular: "review by the appellate
court of the size of verdicts; orders for a new trial where the verdict is thought to be contrary
to the clear weight of the evidence; refusal to be bound by findings of fact of the trial judge
based on documentary evidence; and expanded use of the extraordinary writs of mandamus
and prohibition to control the trial court in its discretionary actions as to the procedure by
which a case is to be handled.").
41. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7, at 22 (4th ed. 1983) (comparing federal
courts of limited jurisdiction, where plaintiff must demonstrate that court has jurisdiction, to
19891
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in effect, every federal court decision is a kind of precedent in federal
jurisdiction, for a federal court must conclude, either explicitly or implicitly,
that it has the power to decide before it may decide. From the time of the
framers, the federal jurisdiction inquiry has been twofold: first, to determine
whether the case falls within the judicial power of article 11,42 and second,
to determine whether the case falls within some particular enabling act of
Congress. 43 There is no presumption of subject matter jurisdiction in the
federal court system similar to that in the state court system. Rather, just
the opposite is true. As a court of limited jurisdiction of a limited sovereign,
federal jurisdiction is presumed lacking unless the invoking party demon-
strates the court's constitutional and statutory power to decide the case."
The Supreme Court has made this self-executing duty of the court of appeals
quite clear: "An appellate federal court must satisfy itself not only of its
own jurisdiction, but also of that of the lower courts in a cause under
review. "4
As with any other federal court, the power of the courts of appeals is
limited in its jurisdictional power by the constitutional principles that elab-
orate upon various aspects of the case or controversy requirement contained
state courts of general jurisdiction, where jurisdiction is presumed unless shown not to exist).
See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION 2d § 3522 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE] (federal
courts may hear only those cases that (1) are within the judicial power of the United States,
as defined by the Constitution; and, (2) that have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional
grant by Congress), citing Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Insurance Corp. Of Ireland,
Ltd., 456 U.S. 1105 (1982); 1 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, H. FINK, D. WECKSTEIN & J. WICKER,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 60[11,[31-[4] (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter 1 MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE]. See, e.g., Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to recast
plaintiff's state tort claim as federal ERISA action, absent explicit directive from Congress,
'because federal courts are "courts of limited jurisdiction [and the] power to adjudicate claims
is limited to that granted by Congress); In re Estate of Sheppard, 658 F. Supp. 729, 733-34
(C.D. I11. 1987) (petitioner sought removal of state probate proceeding to federal district court
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)(c), on grounds ERISA involved in suit but court held no jurisdiction
because petitioner's interest (as employer) not protected by ERISA, thus no clear legislative
mandate for federal jurisdiction and such jurisdiction would have allowed petitioner to enter
court by indirect means when could not do so directly).
42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See also 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41,
at § 3521 (2d ed. 1984) (explaining constitutional basis of judicial power of federal courts).
43. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 442 (1850) ("Courts created by statute can
have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers."); Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 303, 304 (1809) ("statute cannot extend the jurisdiction beyond the limits of the
Constitution."). "As preliminary to any investigation of the merits .. .this court deems it
proper to declare that it disclaims all jurisdiction not given by the constitution, or by the laws
of the United States." Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.).
44. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
45. Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934). See also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379 (1981) ("a court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case
over which it is without jurisdiction.").
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in article III, such as the doctrines of standing and mootness. 46 When these
doctrines are unsatisfied, it would not merely be an error of discretion for
the court to decide an appeal, it would be a violation of the Constitution.
Such an action of excess, by any federal court, offends the constitutional
principle of limited federal sovereignty and thereby encroaches on the sov-
ereign power of the states to order their state judicial systems. While this
Article will necessarily discuss some of these constitutional principles, for
the relatively few cases in which events first trigger them on appeal, they
otherwise will not be emphasized. These principles are more typically con-
tested at the district court level and form the stuff of issues on the merits
of direct appeals.
That the Constitution limits appellate jurisdiction does not imply that
there is a constitutional right to an appeal. Rather, according to Supreme
Court dicta (never directly tested) and the hornbook wisdom (often skepti-
cally expressed), 47 the Constitution does not guarantee an appeal as of right
in either civil or criminal matters. For the most part, any effort to understand
the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals is an exercise in statutory interpre-
tation and, therefore, will be the emphasis here.
D. Rules of Precedent
The individual courts of appeals have developed something of an artificial
autonomy in their stare decisis. When Congress first created circuit judgeships
in 1891, the circuit courts of appeals were designed to correct error and the
judicial lawmaking function was reserved for the Supreme Court.48 When
federal dockets grew, Congress simply added more judges. The addition of
more and more judges resulted in more permutations of three judge panels.
These permutations posed a threat to two institutional values: uniformity
46. See generally 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3902 (1976)
(discussing special limits on jurisdiction-standing); 7 (Part 2) J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & K.
SKINNER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 65.17 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter 7 (Part 2) MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE] (discussing standing to sue, justiciability and related matters); E. CriM-
ERINSKY, supra note 23, ch. 2 at §§ 2.1-2.6.8 (discussing justiciability; constitutional and
prudential limitations on federal judicial power).
47. E.g., W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.1 (1985) (citing McKane v.
Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) ("An appeal from a judgment of conviction is not a matter
of absolute right, independently of constitutional or statutory provisions allowing such appeal
.... [it] is wholly within the discretion of the State to allow or not to allow such a review."));
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.10, at 516-20 (3d ed. 1986).
See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) ("there is, of course, no constitutional
right to an appeal"); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610, 617-18 (1974) (no constitutional right
to counsel for discretionary appellate review). But see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 754
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (no need to decide in this case whether there is or is not a
constitutional right to a first appeal of a criminal conviction); Hood, The Right of Appeal, 29
LA. L. REV. 498 (1969) ("[although] our Federal Constitution does not guaranty [sic] any such
right, the courts in Louisiana ... have held that the right of appeal is a 'constitutional right').
48. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
19891
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 39:235
among panel decisions and effective control over the law of the circuit by
the majority of its judges. The first administrative mechanism designed to
turn back the threat of disuniformity was the en banc rehearing before all
the judges of the circuit.4 9 As the years passed and circuit dockets exploded,
en banc rehearings proved inefficient and ineffective, for they added delay
and expense and consumed premium judicial resources. Therefore, the so-
called "rule of interpanel accord" was developed as a variant of stare decisis
to preserve uniformity and majority control and to avoid too frequent
empaneling of the en banc court.50 This rule, sometimes called "the law of
the circuit," obliges a three-judge panel to treat earlier panel decisions as
binding authority absent intervening en banc or Supreme Court decisions on
the issue.5" Decisions of sister courts of appeals, on the other hand, are
deemed merely persuasive. Thus, each court of appeals has developed a
parallel but independent stare decisis.5 2
49. See Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941) (holding circuit
courts have power to sit en banc). The Court's decision was later codified in the Judicial Code
of 1948, currently found at 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1982). This section provides:
(c) Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or panel of
not more than three judges, . . . unless a hearing or rehearing before the court in
banc is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in regular
active service.
For an interpretation of section 46(c), see Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R.
Co., 345 U.S. 247 (1953). In Western Pac. R.R. Corp., the Supreme Court held that section
46(c) "neither forbids nor requires each active member of a court of appeals to entertain each
petition for a hearing or rehearing en banc. The court is left free to devise its own administrative
machinery to provide the means whereby a majority may order such a hearing." Id. at 250.
Parties, then, have no right to a rehearing en banc. Rather, each court of appeals has discretion
to order such a hearing. See also McFeeley, En Banc Proceedings in the United States Courts
of Appeals, 24 IDAHo L. REV. 255, 257 n.18 (1988) (discussing history of en banc proceedings,
citing Western Pac. R.R. Corp., 345 U.S. at 250-51, for proposition that section 46(c) is "but
a legislative ratification" of Textile Mills).
50. Under the "rule of interpanel accord," one panel is not free to reconsider a decision
by another panel. Accordingly, until the decision of the other panel is overruled by the full
court sitting en banc, it remains the law of the circuit. See McFeeley, supra note 49, at 262
n.42, citing, e.g., Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (one panel not free to
reconsider decision by another panel until overruled by full court sitting en banc), vacated sub
nom. on other grounds, Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); United States v. Oyarzun, 760
F.2d 570, 576-77 (5th Cir. 1985) (appellate panel bound by prior decisions absent en banc
reconsideration); United States v. Gottesman, 724 F.2d 1517, 1523 (11th Cir. 1984) (request
for reconsideration of prior decision "more properly directed to the en banc court, not to this
panel.") (emphasis added). But see North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036,
1044-45 (4th Cir.) (where en banc review prevented by disqualification of all but one of the
active judges of the court and case implicated serious state and federal interests, strict application
of rule of interpanel accord was unwarranted), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977).
51. See McFeeley, supra note 49, at 262 n.42.
52. See United States v. Rodrequez-Cardenos, 866 F.2d 390 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (court rejected
second and sixth circuit sixth amendment interpretations because bound by eleventh circuit
precedent); United States v. Kelley, 864 F.2d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 1989) (seventh circuit not bound
by ninth circuit precedent), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 55 (1989). See generally McFeeley, supra
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The current rules of precedent for the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals
are merely an application of this balkanized stare decisis. Decisions of the
Supreme Court interpreting the federal jurisdictional statutes are, of course,
binding upon each court of appeals. Jurisdictional decisions by a particular
court of appeals, however, directly bind that court only. Although precedent
concerning the jurisdiction -of the court of appeals from sister circuits is
most often used interchangeably, not all the nuance of one circuit's precedent
necessarily translates to another circuit. Research therefore needs to be done
on a circuit-by-circuit basis.
There is a related subtlety of jurisdictional stare decisis between the
Supreme Court and the courts of appeals. Supreme Court jurisdiction to
review state court decisions is couched in statutory language of "final
judgments and decrees" nearly identical to the courts of appeals statutory
grant of jurisdiction to review "all final decisions of the district court,"
although the complications of interlocutory review found in the court of
appeals schema do not apply to Supreme Court review of state court deci-
sions.53 Decisions under the two statutes are most frequently cited inter-
changeably, implying a common meaning.5 4 However, there are some
complexities that apply in each context-state court to Supreme Court or
district court to court of appeals-that militate against a wholly indiscrimi-
nate cross application." It is nonetheless sufficient for present purposes to
note the general rule and to caution against wholly indiscriminate cross-
reference .6
note 49, at 255; Note, En banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodating
Institutional Responsibilities (pts 1 & 2), 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 726 (1965); Annotation, In
Banc Proceedings in Federal Courts of Appeals, 37 A.L.R. FED. 274 (1978).
53. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982) (criteria for review of final decisions of state courts
by Supreme Court) with § 1291 (giving jurisdiction to the courts of appeals to hear appeals
from district court decisions).
54. E.g., National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977) (held
order of a state supreme court was final judgment for purposes of Supreme Court jurisdiction,
because it involved "a right 'separable from and collateral to,' the merits," but relied on Cohen
v. Beneficial Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949), where the court's decision was based on
section 1291, not section 1257, and rather than state court appeal, allowed appeal from federal
district court decision); Gillespie v. United State Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-54 (1964) ("the
requirement of finality is to be given a 'practical rather than a technical construction' and does
not necessarily mean that an order, to be appealable, must be the last possible one to be made
in the case").
55. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265 n.3 (1984) (this case "concerns only
the finality requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . . . [and) likewise does not involve the finality
problems that arise in appeals from state court decisions to this Court under 28 U.S.C. §
1257"), citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). In Cox, the appeal was
from state court on a federal issue, and the issue involved whether this was a "final" decision
when further proceedings remained in state court. The Court allowed the appeal to stand, using
the "pragmatic approach." Id. at 486.
56. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916, 922-24 (1989) (discussing four
categories of cases described in Cox, in which a judgment is final even though further proceedings
are pending in state courts). See generally 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41,
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E. Scope
In order to appreciate the scope of this Article, it is useful to canvass
several matters which will not be discussed.
First, there are a number of "second-look" procedures available in the
district court. Since they are not the emphasis here, the most common may
be simply listed: motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict;" motion
to amend or make additional findings;58 motion for a new trial; 59 motion to
alter or amend a judgment; 60 motion for relief from clerical mistake;61 motion
for relief from mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly discovered
evidence, fraud, void judgment, enforcement inequity, or some "other rea-
son"; 62 and, motion for stay of proceeding. 6
Second, the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is also beyond
the scope of this Article. 64 Effective September 25, 1988, Congress eliminated
substantially all of the Supreme Court's so-called mandatory or obligatory
appellate jurisdiction which previously had authorized a direct appeal from
the district court, bypassing review in the court of appeals. 65 Still, a very
few of the arcane provisions for convening a three-judge district court with
direct appeal to the Supreme Court survive today.66
Third, standards of review are not considered in this Article. The various
phrases for defining the relevant scope of appellate review of a given issue
prescribe: (1) the degree of deference owed to the court being reviewed; (2)
the affirmative power of the reviewing court; (3) the relevant materials
at § 3908 (1976 & Supp. 1989) (collecting cases on finality-Supreme Court Review of state
decisions compared to court of appeals review); 7B J. MOORE, M. WAXNER, H. FINK, D.
EPSTEIN & G. GROTHEER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 1257, 1291 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter
7B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE].
57. FED. R. Crv. P. 50(b).
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(b).
59. FED. R. Cry. P. 59(a).
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
61. FED. R. Cirv. P. 60(a).
62. FED, R. Crv. P. 60(b).
63, FED. R. Civ. P. 62.
64. For full discussion of Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, see e.g., R. STERN, E.
GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (6th ed. 1986); E. CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 23, ch. 10, at 491.
65. Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988). See generally Boskey & Gressman, The
Supreme Court Bids Farewell To Mandatory Appeals, 121 F.R.D. 81 (1988).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1982).
Section 1253 provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court
from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or
permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by an Act of
Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.
See generally 17 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 4040 (2d ed. 1988); 7B
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 56, at § 1253 (construes line of cases limiting direct
appeal to Supreme Court under section 1253).
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appropriate for consideration; (4) the level of scrutiny on review; and, (5)
the framework of analysis for questions of fact and law. 6 A thoughtful
elaboration on these functions would require a separate article, if not a
separate treatise. 68 A standard of review establishes the analytical process
for deciding an issue on an appeal for which the appellate court has concluded
it has jurisdiction. Although the two concepts are related, this Article is
limited to the process by which this second conclusion is reached.
Fourth, this Article cannot summarize all the complexities of federal
appellate procedure. Full length books have been given over to the art of
appellate advocacy. 69 The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure create a
national framework for appellate procedure which has been embellished by
each circuit through the promulgation of Local Rules and Internal Operating
Procedures. Deemed relevant here are only those appellate procedures that
determine directly the power to decide an appeal.
Fifth and finally, this Article focuses only on the decisionmaking respon-
sibility of the courts of appeals to review cases. Matters of judicial admin-
istration, although quite important, are left to the Judicial Council in each
circuit and to the Judicial Conference of the United States. 70 Thus, such
matters as the promulgation of the rules of procedure7' and the procedures
for judicial disability or misconduct 72 are beyond this treatment.
II. PROCEDURES RELATED To THE EXERCISE OF SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION
A. Derivative Jurisdiction
As previously noted, because they are federal courts, the courts of appeals
are courts of limited jurisdiction. 73 While a lack of personal jurisdiction may
67. See generally S. CHILDRESS & M. DAVIS, STANDARDS OF REVIEW: VOL. 1 FEDERAL CIVIL
CASES AND REVIEW PROCESS & VOL. 2 FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES AND ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
(1986).
68. Id.
69. E.g., R. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE-FEDERAL AND STATE CIVIL AP-
PEALS (1983); M. TiGAR, FEDERAL APPEALS-JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE (1987); F. WIENER,
BRIEFING AND ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS (2d ed. 1961).
70. See generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3939 (1977)
(explaining Judicial Councils established by 28 U.S.C. § 332).
71. FED. R. APP. P. 47 (rules by courts of appeals); 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982), as amended
by Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4650 (1988) (provides rule-making
power generally).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 372 (1982) (procedures for judicial disability or misconduct).
73. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. See also Point Landing, Inc., v. Omni Capital
Int'l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415, 423 (5th Cir.) (federal courts may exercise only so much of their
article III jurisdiction as granted by Congress, therefore statutory authorization is necessary to
a federal court's service of summons), aff'd, 484 U.S. 97 (1987); Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v.
Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345, 350 (3d Cir. 1986) (all related doctrines of justiciability rely on concern
that exercise of judicial authority must be properly limited in a democratic society, citing, e.g.,
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be a defect cured by acquiescence (actual, assumed or imposed), the same
is not true for subject matter jurisdiction.7 4 The subject matter jurisdiction
of the federal courts of appeals derives chiefly from the subject matter
jurisdiction of the district courts or other tribunals whose decisions are being
reviewed.7" Therefore, in order for a court of appeals to have jurisdiction
over any given appeal, at the proper time and in the proper manner, the
district court must have originally had subject matter jurisdiction over the
original matter.
7 6
This Article cannot elaborate on the complexity of the various methods
by which a district court may obtain original subject matter jurisdiction such
as diversity,77 general federal question, 7 and special federal question.7 9 These
provisions are complicated even more by the accumulated judicial gloss of
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)); Dracos v.
Hellenic Lines Ltd., 762 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir.) (federal courts are courts of limited juris-
diction-their jurisdiction will not be presumed), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 945 (1985); Giannakos
v. M/V Bravo Trader, 762 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1985) (inferior federal courts have limited
jurisdiction ... dispute must fall within confines of jurisdiction conferred by Constitution and
Congress, otherwise courts have no authority to resolve). See generally 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3522.
74. Compare FED. R. Cxv. P. 12(h)(l) (defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person is
waived in certain circumstances) with FED. R. CIv. P. 12(h)(3) (whenever it appears that the
court lacks jurisdiction of subject matter, the court shall dismiss) (emphasis added to show that
parties may waive personal jurisdictional requirements, but not subject matter jurisdictional
requirements). See, e.g., Giannkos, 762 F.2d at 1297 (question of subject matter jurisdiction
can never be waived, and, if not raised by parties, United States district courts and courts of
appeals have responsibility to consider the question sua sponte and dismiss if such jurisdiction
is lacking), citing In re Kutner, 656 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945
(1982).
75. See Hefley v. Textion, Inc., 713 F.2d 1487, 1495 (10th Cir. 1983) (courts of appeals do
not have power to enlarge jurisdiction of federal district courts by judicial interpretation), citing
American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17 (1951).
76. "The concept of derivative jurisdiction of course does not mean that a court of appeals
lacks authority to review the question whether the district court had jurisdiction. Similarly, the
argument that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction is no basis for defeating the
jurisdiction of the court of appeals to review all jurisdictional questions." 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3901 (Supp. 1989), citing Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303,
306 n.12 (3d Cir. 1984). Cf. A.L. Rowan & Son, Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Department of
Housing & Urban Dev., 611 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1980) (recognizing general formula that appellate
court jurisdiction derives from jurisdiction of district court, but concluded that in case of two
claims, where one was within the subject matter jurisdiction of district court and one within
exclusive jurisdiction of court of claims, appellate court could exercise on its own the district
court's power of transfer to direct transfer of entire action to court of claims). See also Foster
v. Center Township, 798 F.2d 237, 241 (7th Cir. 1986) (if lower court lacked jurisdiction
because plaintiff lacked standing to sue, then appellate court has jurisdiction on appeal, not of
merits but to correct lower court's error).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
79. E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333 (admiralty), 1337 (commerce), 1338 (patents), 1339 (postal) &
1352 (bonds) (1982).
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such doctrines as the rules for calculating the amount in controversy, s0 the
well-pleaded complaint rule, s" and abstention8 2 to mention just a few. While
an attempt even to list, let alone summarize, herein all of the principles of
subject matter jurisdiction would be an undisciplined digression, it is enough
to emphasize the important point that appellate subject matter jurisdiction
derives from the original jurisdiction of the district court and must continue
to exist independently on appeal. Thus, all the concepts concerning original
subject matter jurisdiction remain relevant on appeal.
A related distinction must always be made between a lack of jurisdiction
and a lack of merit. On appeal, as with original jurisdiction, the power of
the court to decide the case depends both on the subject matter of the action
and the status of the parties. It is axiomatic that there is jurisdiction to
decide a case on appeal despite the fact that there is no merit to the appeal
or even if there was no merit to the original complaint. 3
80. See, e.g., Saint Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938)
(amount claimed by plaintiff controls if claim is apparently made in good faith-must appear
to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less to justify dismissal).
81. Louisville & N. R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (plaintiff must raise
federal question in the complaint; to anticipate a federal question defense does not satisfy
federal question jurisdictional requirement).
82. See M. REDISH, TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER ch. 9 (1980) (discussing
the various abstention doctrines).
83. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (subject matter jurisdiction not defeated merely
because a party fails to state a cause of action, rather, "failure to state a proper cause of
action calls for a judgment of the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.").
See also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.) (explaining Bell), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
897 (1981). In Williamson, the court noted that, in the interest of judicial economy, where a
defendant's challenge to the court's jurisdiction is also a challenge to the existence of a federal
cause of action, the proper course of action for the district court is to find that jurisdiction
exists and deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiff's case. Id. at
415. Exceptions to this rule occur where the alleged claim under the Constitution or federal
statutes "clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining
jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous." Id. (citing Bell, 327
U.S. at 682). See, e.g., Goldman v. Gallant Securities, Inc., 878 F.2d 71, 73 (2d Cir. 1989)
(appellant alleged violations of federal and state law; because district court could not say either
that plaintiff made federal claims solely for purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or that claims
were so insubstantial as not to deserve at least preliminary review on merits, court improperly
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson
Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 239 (4th Cir. 1988) (Powell, J., sitting by designation) ("If the
complaint alleges a violation of federal law and the claim is 'neither immaterial nor insubstantial,
the proper course of action is for the district court to accept jurisdiction and address [an]
objection as an attack on the merits' (citing Bell, 327 U.S. at 682)); Daniel v. Ferguson, 839
F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988) (district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction;
appellate court reversed in part because should have found jurisdiction existed then directly
attacked merits of plaintiff's case); Chiplin Enter., Inc. v. City of Lebanon, 712 F.2d 1524,
1529 (lst Cir. 1983) (court affirmed dismissal, but noted that plaintiff's failure to state federal
claim should have been grounds for dismissal rather than jurisdictional grounds); Inland Oil &
Transp. Co. v. Adams, 575 F.2d 184, 190 (8th Cir. 1978) (distinction exists between absence
of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, however, often this distinction is not
19891
DEPA UL LA W RE VIEW
The additional jurisdictional requirement which accompanies an appeal is
the notion of finality or some reason to excuse finality for interlocutory
review.14 This notion is best understood as the structure of the relationship
between the reviewing court and the court being reviewed. The reviewing
court always should consider its own jurisdiction as a condition precedent
to any further action on appeal. That, of course, is the subject of the
remainder of this Article.
B. Scope of Review
Once jurisdiction attaches, the appellate power is plenary. By statute, the
court of appeals is vested with the power to "affirm, modify, vacate, set
aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought
before it for review, and may remand the cause, . . or require such further
proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances." 5 Thus it
important from practical standpoint because district courts often hold that a case lacks subject
matter jurisdiction when they mean the complaint failed to state a claim); Mahone v. Waddle,
564 F.2d 1018, 1022 (3d Cir. 1977) (explaining Bell v. Hood, in that a federal district court
has subject matter jurisdiction over a case whenever pleadings allege matters in controversy
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that question of jurisdiction
is analytically distinct from question of whether party has stated a cause of action), cert. denied,
438 U.S. 904 (1978); Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967) (court dismissed for failure
to state a claim but should have dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction so plaintiff
could seek relief in state courts). See generally 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note
41, § 3522, at 79 n.29; 5 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 1350 (Supp.
1989), citing Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 237 (5th Cir. 1983) ("if the facial attack defeats
jurisdiction, the case should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) ...[but] if the case survives the
facial jurisdictional attack, a failure of the existence of the cause of action should be disposed
by a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on the merits"). The Lewis court explained, conversely, that if the
jurisdictional challenge does not implicate the merits of ihe cause of action, the jurisdictional
basis must survive both facial and factual attacks before the district court can address the
merits of the claim. Id, at 237, citing Williamson, 645 F.2d at 412-15 & n.9.
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ("the courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions ...
of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of
the Canal"); M. TIOAR, supra note 69, at §§ 2.02, 2.03 & 2.04 (discussing issue of what
constitutes a final judgment for purposes of appeal, civil and criminal appeals, and exceptions
to the finality requirement). See also 9 J. MOORE, B. WARD & J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 110.02 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE) (discussing 28
U.S.C. § 1291). For an additional discussion of finality, see infra Part Ill.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1982). See, e.g., United States v. White, 855 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1988)
(circuit courts exercise supervisory power over all district courts in the circuit), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 3172 (1989); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985) ("It cannot be doubted that
the courts of appeals have supervisory powers that permit, at the least, the promulgation of
procedural rules governing the management of litigation."), citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
335 (1980) (approved circuit court's exercise of supervisory powers to require district court
inquiry concerning joint representation of criminal defendants). The Arn Court, in a footnote,
explained that the supervisory power rests on firmest ground when used to establish rules of
judicial procedure. 474 U.S. at 147 n.5 (citing Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in
Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of The Federal Courts,
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has been suggested, although somewhat facetiously, that a circuit judge with
a concurring second vote can "do justice" within constitutional and statutory
limits. A few general and particular limits, beyond those of precedent and
the judicial hierarchy, should nonetheless be mentioned briefly.
Generally, Congress has narrowed the scope of appellate review in both
civil and criminal matters, to remove from consideration "errors or defects
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." ' s6 This concept of
"harmless error" varies with the character of the issue being raised; different
analyses apply whether the error was preserved by an objection, whether the
matter is civil or criminal, and whether the issue is of constitutional pro-
portion.87
A second general, although rarely mentioned, statute provides that there
shall be no reversal in the courts of appeals "for error in ruling upon matters
in abatement which do not involve jurisdiction. 8a The reach of this provision
may be described, with some finesse, as including nonjurisdictional motions
which, if granted, would result in the dismissal of an action without prejudice
to its reconsideration when refiled by another pleading or in another forum.8 9
84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1465 (1984) (federal courts have inherent authority to regulate
"technical details and policies intrinsic to the litigation process")). See generally 15 FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3901 (1976 & Supp. 1989) (discussing supervisory
powers).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1982). See generally McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood,
464 U.S. 548, 553-54 (1984) (doctrine of harmless error embodies- "the principle that courts
should exercise judgment in preference to the automatic reversal for 'error' and ignore errors
that do not affect the essential fairness of the trial"; noting also that FED. R. Clv. P. 61
technically applies only to district courts, but that circuit courts should act in accordance with
the policy of Rule 61). See FED. R. Civ. P. 61 (no error is grounds for reversal, new trial,
modifying, etc., unless refusal to take such action appears to court inconsistent with substantial
justice); FED. R. EvID 103(a) ("Effect of erroneous ruling-error may not be predicated upon
a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected").
87. See generally S. CHILDRESS & M. DAVIS, supra note 67, at §§ 1.07, 6.5; 11 FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at §§ 2881-2883 (1973) (doctrine of "plain error"
applies in most civil or criminal cases, however, in criminal cases some constitutional errors
can never be treated as harmless and other constitutional errors are harmless only if "beyond
a reasonable doubt", citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24, 28 (1967); 7 J. MOORE
& J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 61.11 (1987) [hereinafter 7 MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE] (discussing application of harmless error rule to circuit courts).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 2105 (1982).
89. See generally 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3903 (1976)
(section 2105 is one of "most commonly ignored provisions of the Judicial Code . . . its most
important feature is certainly its disuse."); 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 87, at
61.11 (citing e.g., Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines S.R.L., 844 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1988) (statute
did not make refusal to enforce forum-selection clause unreviewable after final judgment and
would not allow refusal to enforce clause to be reviewed at earlier state; statute not to be taken
literally), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 1976 (1989)); Hayes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 1332, 1332 n.l
(7th Cir. 1983) (district court order granting motion to stay proceedings and ordering parties
to proceed to an appraisal ruled on the merits of insured's action on the contract and thus was
appealable; order was not merely one of abatement).
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There are a few particular limits on the jurisdiction of the courts of
appeals to be found in Title 28. An order of a district court remanding a
case previously removed to it from a state court "is not reviewable on appeal
or otherwise." Likewise, there is a prohibition on appeals from final orders
in proceedings in the nature of habeas corpus brought to test the validity of
a warrant to remove a person charged with a federal crime to a different
district or place of confinement. 9'
Although the courts of appeals are courts of limited jurisdiction and
subject to these and other various statutory limitations, the plenary power
to decide a proper appeal has a dimension of inherent authority. There is a
vague notion of pendent or ancillary appellate jurisdiction exhibited whenever
the reviewing court contemplates the scope of its own reviewing authority
to go beyond the questions presented on appeal. The basic notion underlying
traditional pendent or ancillary jurisdiction is that if a federal court qua
court has some jurisdiction in a particular matter, it then has the power to
decide the entire case or controversy, including aspects of the matter over
which there is no independent jurisdictional basis. This is a rather curious
notion when juxtaposed with the notion of a limited federal jurisdiction,
but is understandable as an inherent power with which the federal court qua
court is possessed. While the exercise of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction is
more commonplace at the district court level, it is also part of the federal
appellate jurisdiction. 92 For example, some applications involve the courts
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1982). There is an exception to this limitation for civil rights cases
removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1982).
Section 1447(d) provides: "An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was
removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to
the State court from which it was removed pursuant to § 1443 of this title shall be reviewable
by appeal or otherwise." See, e.g., Baucom v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 674 F. Supp. 1175 (M.D.N.C.
1987) (removal statute strictly construed against removal, with all doubts resolved in favor of
remand); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Brown, 535 F. Supp. 486 (D.C. Ark. 1982) (removal statute
strictly construed in favor of state court jurisdiction).
Section 1443 provides:
Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a state
court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending: ...
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such
State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the
United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for
equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent
with such law.
28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1982).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1982).
92. See generally 16 FEDERAL PRAcTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3937 (1977)
(court of appeals may decide questions beyond obvious limits authorized by appeal through
"species of ancillary or pendent jurisdiction."). But see General Motors Corp. v. Gibson Chem.
& Oil Corp., 786 F.2d 105, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1986) (court declined to invoke pendent jurisdiction
because such jurisdiction is discretionary and usually better to avoid unless issues presented by
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of appeals' determination of the proper scope of appeal from a final judg-
ment. More frequently, however, these concepts are applied to broaden the
scope of an interlocutory appeal so as to allow consideration of matters
beyond the particular order on review. This makes sense since the disruption,
delay, and expense of an appeal prior to final judgment have already
occurred. 93 At any rate, these exercises of the power of "pendent review"
are still developing and the answers to the jurisdictional questions raised are
not yet certain. 94
C. Standing to Appeal
In most appeals, whether the appellant has standing to prosecute the
appeal is a straightforward question with an obvious answer. 9 Generally, a
plaintiff who does not have standing to sue does not have standing to bring
an appeal, although the rules and decisions on the former status are much
more detailed than those on the latter. A simple rule of thumb is whether
the judgment being challenged has an adverse impact on the individual
appellant or, in the case of a cross-appeal, the issues raised might have an
adverse effect upon a reversal on the main appeal. Deciding whether an
impact is adverse may, at times, become somewhat metaphysical. In a recent
leading opinion, the Supreme Court neatly summarized the operative rules:
Ordinarily, only a party aggrieved by a judgment or order of a district
court may exercise the statutory right to appeal therefrom. A party who
receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment
affording the relief and cannot appeal from it .... The rule is one of
federal appellate practice, however, derived from the statutes granting
appellate jurisdiction and the historic practices of the appellate courts; it
does not have its source in the jurisdictional limitations of Art. III. In an
appealable and nonappealable orders overlap); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 433 F.2d 117, 120 (5th
Cir. 1970) (refused to apply principle of pendent jurisdiction to interlocutory appeal, despite
"temptation to consider everything on a sort of ad hoc pendent jurisdictional basis," because
issue was one of appellate jurisdiction rather than convenience).
93. 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3937 (1977) (strong reasons
to accept conclusion that court of appeals should at least have power to extend scope of review
include fact that disruption, delay and expense that attend appeal of final judgment have
already occurred).
94. See, e.g., San Filippo v. U.S. Trust Co., 470 U.S. 1035, 1036 (1985) (White, J.,
dissenting) (although Second Circuit invoked doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to consider appeal
of nonfinal orders under collateral order doctrine, Justice White disagreed, citing Abney v.
United States, 451 U.S. 651 (1977) (court may exercise collateral order jurisdiction over appeal
from pretrial order which denied motion to dismiss but such jurisdiction did not extend to
"other claims . . . unless they too fall under Cohen collateral order doctrine"; the doctrine
should be sparingly applied)); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 94 (2d Cir. 1983) (because
appellate court reversed judgment and remanded for further proceedings, it dismissed cross
appeal from disqualification order on ground that order no longer final).
95. See generally 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3902 (1976)
(discussing special limits on jurisdiction-standing); 7 (Part 2) MoORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 46, at 65.17 (discussing standing to sue, justiciability and related matters).
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appropriate case appeal may be permitted from an adverse ruling collateral
to the judgment on the merits at the behest of the party who has prevailed
on the merits, so long as that party retains a stake in the appeal satisfying
the requirements of Art. 1II.9
Each of these principles, of course, has a certain iceberg quality.
The rule for a cross-appeal is somewhat related. 97 An appellee usually may
argue for affirmance of the decision on a ground not decided by the district
court without filing a cross-appeal. Generally, however, the appellee may
not rely on the original appeal to obtain a modification of the judgment but
must bring a cross-appeal. Although there are contrary authorities, this rule
is best considered not to be a matter of jurisdiction and therefore may be
ignored for good reason.
D. Courts Originating Appeals
Functionally and statistically, the district courts are the most significant
source of appeals to the courts of appeals. In civil and criminal matters, 98
these include appeals from final judgments,99 orders in the nature of final
judgments, t °° interlocutory orders entitled °10 or permitted'02 to be appealed,
and review by way of extraordinary writ.' °3 About ten percent, more for the
District of Columbia Circuit, of the appellate docket involves judicial review
of final decisions and certain interim or interlocutory orders of dozens of
96. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980) (citing Electrical Fittings Corp.
v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939)). See also Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72 (1987)
(dismissed appeal for want of jurisdiction because parties who participated in lawsuit solely in
their official capacity had left office before they appealed, therefore they did not have standing);
Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546-49 (1986) (respondent member of
school board had no personal stake in outcome therefore had no standing to appeal in individual
capacity); In re First Colonial Corp., 693 F.2d 447, 449-50 (5th Cir. 1982) (party who successfully
opposed motion to recuse judge below had no injury on this claim, thus had no standing to
appeal); Fisher v. Tucson School Dist. No. 1, 625 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1980) (parents of school
children who would not be involved in busing lacked standing to appeal busing order), cited
in 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3902 (Supp. 1989).
97. 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3904 (1976 & Supp. 1989)
(discussing special limits on jurisdiction-cross appeals). See Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569
(1982) (appellees may use statutory argument not presented to district court in support of
judgment on cross appeal); Bullard v. Sercon Corp., 846 F.2d 463, 467-68 (7th Cir. 1988)
(appellee who won on merits need not file cross appeal to argue court should have dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction); Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 439 (7th Cir. 1987)
("Cross-appeals for the sole purpose of making an argument in support of the judgment are
worse than unnecessary ... they disrupt the briefing schedule and they make the case less
readily understandable"), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1067 (1988); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 84, at 204.11 (discussing time for taking cross or other separate appeals).
98. See infra Part VI.
99. See infra Part III(B).
100. See infra Parts III(B) & (C).
101. See infra Part IV(B).
102. See infra Part IV(C).
103. See infra Part V(C).
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federal agencies, boards and offices.'- In addition, the appropriate court of
appeals has, by statute, exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the
United States Tax Court "in the same manner and to the same extent as
decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury."'' 0
As amended in 1984, the bankruptcy statute creates a three-tiered review:
from bankruptcy judge to district court or bankruptcy panel, then to a court
of appeals.'° Aside from orders that otherwise fit the general appellate
criteria under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the bankruptcy statute grants the courts of
appeals jurisdiction to review all final decisions, judgments, and decrees
entered by either a district court on appeal to such court from a bankruptcy
judge or by a bankruptcy appellate panel established by order of a judicial
council of the circuit to review bankruptcy court orders. 07
Several other sources of appeals need be mentioned. The Federal Magis-
trate Act of 1979108 created two additional sources of jurisdiction for the
courts of appeals: specified direct appeals from a magistrate, and discre-
104. 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3940 (1977) (providing statistics
on number of administrative review proceedings from THE ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS). See infra Parts VII(A) & (B).
105. 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a) (1982) (courts of appeals jurisdictional provision). See generally M.
GARBIS & A. SCHWAIT, TAX COURT PRACTICE (1974); M. GARBIS & S. STRUNTZ, TAX PROCEDURE
AND TAX FRAUD (1981). See also 17 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at §
4102 (2d ed. 1988) (confession of error by Internal Revenue Service does not destroy jurisdiction
of Tax Court, citing Bowman v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 681, 685 (1951)); id. at § 4102 (District
of Columbia Court of Appeals has venue of a tax case if taxpayer residence provisions are
inapplicable, citing 26 U.S.C. § 7482(b)(1)); 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at
213.03[1.-2.] (court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of Tax Court).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 158 (1982), which reads in pertinent part:
§ 158. Appeals
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals from
final judgments, orders and decrees, and, with leave of the court, from interlocutory
orders and decrees, of bankruptcy judges entered in cases and proceedings referred to
the bankruptcy judges under section 157 of this title. An appeal under this subsection
shall be taken only to the district court for the judicial district in which the bankruptcy
judge is serving.
(b)(1) The judicial council of a circuit may establish a bankruptcy appellate panel,
comprised of bankruptcy judges from districts within the circuit, to hear and determine,
upon the consent of all the parties, appeals under subsection (a) of this section.
(d) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions,
judgments, orders and decrees entered under subsections (a) and (b) of this section.
Id.
107. 28 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. III 1985). The peculiar nature of the exclusive federal original
jurisdiction skews the analysis of the appellate jurisdiction. See generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3926 (1977) (bankruptcy appeals); 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 1 110.23, 110.24 (orders appealable under Bankruptcy Act and
procedure for seeking permission to appeal).
108. Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (1979) (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1982)). See generally
15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3901.1 (1976 & Supp. 1989) (magistrate
appeals); 7B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 56, at § 636.
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tionary review after direct review in the district court. Furthermore, although
they seldom do, individual judges of the courts of appeals are authorized to
issue writs of habeas corpus and prisoners may so challenge their custody
under state or federal judgments of confinement.'°9 Finally, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982 with national
jurisdiction over a variety of subject matters.110 Included in the Federal
Circuit's appellate jurisdiction are cases originating from the United States
Claims Court, the Board of Patent Appeals, district courts in patent matters,
the United States Court of International Trade, and other miscellaneous
agencies and executive officers."'
E. The Locus of Appeals
In most cases, the proper locus of appeal is obvious. The notice of appeal
designates the court of appeals for the circuit geographically encompassing
the district court in which the suit was filed."12 There may be optional
appellate venues in certain matters, such as in reviews of agency matters." 3
Furthermore, appellate venue may be manipulated by the strategic choice
among optional trial venues, for example, in tax cases," 4 or by a motion
for a general change of venue in civil matters." 5 Again, the various provisions
governing the Federal Circuit are so complex as to oblige only a disclaimer
of incompleteness in this Article." 6
109. FED. R. APP. P. 22(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1982) ("Power to grant writ").
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982).
Ill. Id. See generally 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3903.1 (1976
& Supp. 1989) (discussing special courts of appeals).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1294 (1982). Section 1294 provides:
Appeals from reviewable decisions of the district and territorial courts shall be
taken to the courts of appeals as follows:
(1) From a district court of the United States to the court of appeals for the circuit
embracing the district;
(2) From the United States District Court for the district of the Canal Zone, to the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit;
(3) From the District Court of the Virgin Islands to the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit;
(4) From the District Court of Guam, to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
See also 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (1982) (consolidation of multidistrict cases).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 2112 (1982). As of this writing, rules have been proposed for multicircuit
petitions for review. PROPOSED RULES, JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIoATION 840 F.2d
No. 2 at ci-cxvii (Mar. 31, 1988). See infra Part VII(A).
114. See generally 17 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 4102 (2d ed.
1988) (discussing the tax court); 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 1 213.01-
.03[51 (discussing the history, creation, organization, jurisdiction and procedure of tax court).
115. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 (1982). See generally Annotation, Mandamus, Prohibition or
Interlocutory Appeal As Proper Remedy to Seek Review of District Court's Disposition of
Motion for Change of Venue Under § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) of Judicial Code, 2 A.L.R. FED.
573 (1969).
116. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
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F. The Notice of Appeal
The requirements as to the form of the notice of appeal are simple and
straightforward." 7 Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires a notice to be filed with the clerk of the court that rendered the
judgment which "shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall
designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from; and shall name
the court to which the appeal is taken.""' Even such minimal content
requirements are excused as long as the true intent of the appellant is
ascertainable, the courts have not been misled, and there has been no
prejudice to the other parties.a19 The requirements for timeliness of the notice
of appeal, by contrast, are of another magnitude of complexity and trigger
draconian effects upon their breach.
Timeliness of the notice of appeal is jurisdictional. Determining the time-
liness of a notice of appeal may have become as arcane as appellate juris-
diction can become. Separate rules apply for permissive interlocutory
appeals,12 0 agency review,'' bankruptcy and appeals,12 2 Tax Court review,
2 3
and habeas corpus cases. 2 4 Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Pro-
117. See generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3949 (1977)
(appeals as of right-how taken); 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 203.03-
.05 (explaining FED. R. App. P. 3).
118. FED. R. App. P. 3(c). See also FED. R. App. P. 12(a) (docketing the appeal). See
generally M. TIGAR, supra note 69, at § 6.02 ("Notice of Appeal in Appeals of Right.").
119. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962) (court should have treated second notice
of appeal, which failed to indicate the judgment appealed from, as "effective, although inept,
attempt to appeal from the judgment sought to be vacated."). But cf. Torres v. Oakland
Scavenger Co., 108 S. Ct. 2405, 2408-09 (1988) (in spite of Foman principle that procedural
requirements for notice of appeal be liberally construed, failure to comply with specificity
requirement of Rule 3(c) was insufficient notice even under liberal construction because Rule
3(c) is a jurisdiction prerequisite).
120. 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3951 (1977) (discussing
permissive appeals under section 1292(b)); 7B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 56, at
§ 1292. For general analysis of the Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, see id. at § 110.24 for
procedure for seeking interlocutory appeals); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at
205.01-07 (appeals by permission under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Rule 5).
121. 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at §§ 3961-3966 (1977) (discussing
review and enforcement of orders of administrative agencies, boards, commissions and officers);
9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 215.01-220.02 (discussing rules regarding
agency review).
122. 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3952 (1977) (discussing Rule
6, bankruptcy appeals by allowance); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at
206.01-.07 (discussing bankruptcy and appeals).
123. 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at §§ 3959-3960 (1977) (discussing
review of decisions of United States Tax Court); 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84,
at 213.03-.0315] (stay of collection pending appeal from a decision of the tax court), 214.02
(application of other rules to appeals from decisions of tax court).
124. 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at §§ 3968-3970 (1977) (discussing
Rules 22, 23 and 24, "Habeas Corpus Proceedings; Custody of Prisoners in Habeas Corpus
Proceedings and Proceedings in Forma Pauperis"); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note
84, at 222.01-224.04 (discussing history of Rule 22, "Habeas Corpus Petitions to Judges of
the Courts of Appeals; Necessity of Certificate of Probable Cause for Appeal").
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cedure generally governs appeals as of right in civil and criminal matters. 25
In civil cases, Rule 4 requires a notice of appeal to be filed within thirty
days after entry of judgment, unless the United States is a party in which
case sixty days is allowed. 2 6 In criminal cases, the notice is due within ten
days of entry of the judgment or order and within thirty days for government
appeals. 12 Both periods may be extended thirty days on the ground of
"excusable neglect.' ' 2 Cross-appeals must be filed within fourteen days of
the filing of the first notice. 29 The chief complication arising from these
timetables has to do with the judgment-suspending effect of various motions
in the district court. Several post-trial motions suspend the finality of the
judgment and the time for filing the notice of appeal so that the time begins
to run from the decision on the motion. The motions with this effect include:
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; 130 motion for new trial;"3 '
motion to amend the findings;3 2 motion to alter or amend the judgment;'
motion for new (criminal) trial; 34 and, motion for arrest of (criminal)
judgment.' Thus, a premature notice of appeal, filed before the disposition
of any of these motions, in the words of Rule 4, "shall have no effect."
Since the notice must be timely, a premature filing of an appeal without a
timely refiling will leave the court of appeals without jurisdiction.3 6
125. See generally Hall, The Jurisdictional Nature of the Time to Appeal, 21 GA. L. REV.
399 (1986) (discussing strict enforcement of Rule 4 timing requirements and Supreme Court's
characterization of timing rules as "mandatory and jurisdictional"); 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3950 (1977) (discussing Rule 4, appeals as of right; when
taken); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 204.01-.20 (comprehensive treatment
of timing requirement).
126. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). Rule 4 provides:
(a) Appeals in Civil Cases -(1) In a civil case in which an appeal is permitted by
law as of right from a district court to a court of appeals the notice of appeal
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the district court within 30 days
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from ....
Id. See also FED. R. App. P. 26 (computing actual date for appeal and motion procedure for
extending time to appeal).
127. FED. R. App. P. 4(b) (appeals in criminal cases).
128. Id. ("Upon a showing of excusable neglect the district court may, before or after the
time has expired, with or without motion and notice, extend the time for filing a notice of
appeal for a period not to exceed 30 days from the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed
by this subdivision.").
129. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(3).
130. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
131. FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
132. FED. R. CIv. P. 52(b).
133. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
134. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33.
135. FED. R. CRIM. P. 34.
136. See Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 109 S. Ct. 987, 991-93 (1989) (postjudgment motion
for discretionary prejudgment interest falls under Rule 59(e) therefore any notice of appeal
filed while such motion was pending is ineffective under Rule 4(a)(4)); Budinich v. Benton
Dickinson and Co., 486 U.S. 196 (1988) (request for attorney's fees not generally part of merits
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G. Transferring Appeals
If an appeal in a civil action or a petition for agency review is filed in
the wrong court of appeals so that jurisdiction is lacking, the matter may
be transferred to the court of appeals in which the appeal could have been
brought at the time notice was incorrectly filed, provided such transfer is
"in the interest of justice."' 1 This often overlooked provision is invoked
most frequently between the regional courts of appeals and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, although it is not limited to that usage: 38
of action and does not prevent finality of judgment, therefore court of appeals correctly held
appeal untimely because not within 30 days of order, even though no ruling on attorney's fees);
Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc., 485 U.S. 265 (1988) (per curiam) (application for costs, incorrectly
brought as a Rule 59(e) motion, actually was Rule 54(d) motion rather than motion to alter or
amend judgment; thus did not render notice of appeal ineffective); Acosta v. Louisiana Dep't
Health & Human Resources, 478 U.S. 251, 253 (1986) (per curiam) (notice of appeal, filed
after district court denied motion to alter or amend judgment but before order was entered on
docket, premature and failure to file new notice requires court to comply with plain language
of Rule 4(a)(4) and to treat first notice as a nullity); Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount
Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (respondent filed notice of appeal while motion to alter or amend
judgment pending; Court held that after 1979 amendments to Rules of Appellate Procedure,
premature notice is "as if no notice is filed at all and Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction.").
See also 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3950 (1977 & Supp. 1982)
(subsequent notice of appeal is also ineffective if filed while timely Rule 59 motion still pending);
9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 204.12 [1] (post-1979 effect of Rule 59
motion on previously filed notice of appeal-"the appeal simply self-destructs"), cited in
Griggs, 459 U.S. at 61.
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1982).
138. See United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64, 75-76 (1987) (remand with instructions to
transfer, because mixed case which presented both a nontax Little Tucker Act claim and FTCA
claim may be appealed only to Federal Circuit which has "exclusive jurisdiction over every
appeal from a Tucker Act or non-tax Little Tucker Act claim."); Christianson v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2166, 2176, 2178 (1985) (in jurisdictional dispute between Court of
Appeals for Federal Circuit arid Seventh Circuit, after the case transferred from one to the
other, the Supreme Court held that the particular complaint did not constitute a case arising
under the patent statutes, and therefore Federal Circuit had no jurisdiction and should not
have decided the merits prior to transfer to the Seventh Circuit. The Court vacated the judgment
of the Federal Circuit and remanded with instructions to transfer to the Seventh Circuit). See,
e.g., Ross v. Colorado Outward Bound School, Inc., 822 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir. 1987) (collecting
cases where federal courts have invoked section 1631 in transfers between other federal courts);
Wilson v. Turnage, 755 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1985), transferred to 791 F.2d 151 (Fed. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 988 (1986); Olveira v. United States, 734 F.2d 760, 762 (1 1th Cir.
1984) (transfer from Eleventh Circuit to Federal Circuit). See generally Note, Christianson v.
Colt Industries Operating Corp.: The Seventh Circuit Shoots for Multiple Transfer of Cases,
1988 UTAH L. REV. 455; 18 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 4478 (1981
& Supp. 1989) (transferee court should adhere to transferring court's pre-transfer rulings as
law of case, much the same as one district judge treats rulings of a colleague), citing Dynalectron
Corp. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 424, 431, aff'd without opinion, 758 F.2d 665 (Fed. Cir.
1984). See also IA (Part 2) J. MOORE, W. TAGGERT, A. VESTAL, J. WICKER & B. RINGLE,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.346[9]-[10] (1989) (transfer between federal courts; transfer of
administrative review proceedings from one appellate court to another).
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H. Miscellaneous Procedures
The experienced reader can appreciate firsthand how procedure informs
substance, and how resolution of procedural questions can shape the con-
sideration of an appeal and determine its outcome. This represents an
important dimension of the courts of appeals' jurisdiction-the power to
determine how to go about exercising the power to decide appeals.3 9 Most
relevant here are motion practice and procedures of mandate.
Motion practice is not monolithic-according to the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure and Local Rules in each circuit, specified motions are
decided by the clerk's office, by a single circuit judge, by a multi-judge
administrative panel, or by a hearing panel. Internal procedures vary from
circuit to circuit. 40 Lesser matters, such as perfunctory filing extensions, are
best left to the routine of the clerk's office. While the appellate rule specif-
ically prohibits a single judge from dismissing an appeal,' 4' the Committee
Commentary to Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure lists
dozens of matters which are placed within the jurisdiction of a single circuit
judge, either by rule or statute. These matters include entering a stay, issuing
a certificate of probable cause, permitting intervention, appointing counsel,
et cetera.
Other motions are expressly placed beyond the jurisdiction of a single
judge, such as requests for permission to appeal, 42 requests for extraordinary
relief,' 43 and petitions for rehearing. 44 The most common appellate motions
include: motion to voluntarily withdraw and dismiss the appeal; 4 motion
for stay or injunction pending review; 46 motion to expedite the appeal; 47
and, a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief.14
A mandate is simply the order issued by the court of appeals, after decision
of the appeal, directing some action be taken or some disposition be made
of the matter in the court being reviewed. A mandate is composed of a
certified copy of the judgment or order of the court of appeals, along with
139. See generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at §§ 3971-3994
(1977) (discussing rules that govern procedural aspects of appeals, such as rules for filing and
service, computation and extension of time, motions, briefs, appendices to briefs, filing and
service of briefs, form of briefs); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 225.01-
247.02 (discussing procedure of appeals).
140. See FED. R. App. P. 27 (general motion procedures and power of single judge to
entertain motions).
141. FED. R. App. P. 27(c) (power of single judge to entertain motions).
142. FED. R. App. P.5, 5.1, 6 (appeals by permission under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c)(5), and in bankruptcy proceedings).
143. FED. R. App. P. 21 (writs of mandamus and prohibition directed to a judge or judges
and other extraordinary writs).
144. FED. R. App. P. 40 (petition for rehearing).
145. FED. R. App. P. 42(b) (voluntary dismissal).
146. FED. R. App. P. 8, 18 (stay or injunction pending appeal and stay pending review).
147. FED. R. App. P. 31(a) (time for serving and filing briefs).
148. FED. R. App. P. 29 (brief of an amicus curiae).
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the written opinion, if any, and any court order regarding appellate costs. 4 9
Until it issues, all jurisdiction is retained by the appellate court and, once
issued, the mandate binds the reviewed court or agency. The issuance of the
mandate is stayed by the filing of a petition for rehearing' ° or a petition
for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.' 5' A timely petition for
rehearing to the panel automatically stays the issuance of the mandate,
5 2
while a suggestion for en banc rehearing, if granted, typically has the effect
of vacating the panel opinion and judgment and staying the mandate.' In
addition, there is a kind of inherent power in a court of appeals to recall a
mandate, on rare and uncertain occasions, to prevent some manifest injus-
tice.1 4
III. APPEALS FROM FINAL DECISIONS-CIVIL
A. Generally
The principal grant of jurisdiction to the courts of appeals confers the
power to review "all final decisions of the district court.'"" Therefore,
unless it fits into one of the relatively narrow statutes authorizing interloc-
utory appeals, 5 6 the power to review a judgment or order depends on this
characteristic of "finality."
The history of this requirement is long, if not illuminating. Finality has
been a statutory requirement for as long as there have been federal appellate
courts. 5 7 Courts have consistently deemed the requirement of a final decision
to be jurisdictional.15 Functionally, the requirement structures the relation-
149. FED. R. App. P. 41 (issuance of mandate; stay of mandate).
150. FED. R. APP. P. 35(c), 40 (suggestion of a party for rehearing or rehearing en banc).
151. SuP. CT. R. 23.2 (found in 110 S. Ct. No. 4, at CIII) ("A petitioner entitled thereto
may present to a Justice of this Court an application to stay the enforcement of the judgment
sought to be reviewed on writ of certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f).").
152. FED. R. APP. P. 41(a) ("The timely filing of a petition for rehearing will stay the
mandate until disposition of the petition unless otherwise ordered by the court.").
153. E.g., 5TH CIR. R. 41.3. "Effect of Granting Rehearing en Banc. Unless otherwise
expressly provided, the effect of granting a rehearing en banc is to vacate the panel opinion
and judgment of the court and to stay the mandate." (emphasis added).
154. 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3987 (1977); 9 MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 241.02[4] (no specific provision in Rules of Appellate
Procedure for recall of the mandate).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982) (grant of jurisdiction to
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
156. See infra Parts IV(A)-(C) & V(A)-(C).
157. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 21, 22, 25, 1 Stat. 73. See generally 15 FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3906 (1976 & Supp. 1989) (providing history of
finality requirement); 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGERT & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
54.04[2] (1988) [hereinafter 6 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE] (discussing the final judgment rule).
158. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379 (1981). In Firestone, the
Supreme Court held that a district court's pretrial order, which denied a motion to disqualify
counsel, was not appealable under section 1291 prior to final judgment in the underlying
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ship between appellate court and trial court; within this relationship, each
court performs its complementary role. 159 Continuing past a ruling which is
reversible error, in order to complete the trial and then to require an appeal
and retrial, expends scarce judicial resources, arguably unnecessarily. The
postponement of review imposed by the final decision rule is justified
implicitly by an assumption that an even greater inefficiency, or waste of
resources, would result if each and every ruling that might be reversed on
appeal was immediately and separately appealable. The function of the trial
court is to find facts and apply general principles of law.160 To perform this
function requires a range of discretion over trial procedures., 61 Most trial
rulings therefore do not result in reversal, and most often factfinding is a
necessary precedent to deciding legal questions.162 The final decision require-
ment thus preserves the integrity of the trial court function. The value of
self-correction is also preserved, by postponing review at least until the trial
judge has had an opportunity to rule finally and fully on the matter.
Frequently, interlocutory trial court rulings are reconsidered. Most signif-
icant is the assumption of efficiency. Postponing review of a ruling may
deemphasize the issue, for example, if the parties settle or the trial outcome
turns out not to depend on the ruling, or if there is simply no .appeal.
Repeated interlocutory appeals would only impede and prolong the trial and
could exacerbate any inequality of resources between the adversaries. Prag-
matically considered, the policy of the final decision requirement recognizes
that most appeals after final judgment-four out of five-are affirmed and,
presumably, so would most interlocutory appeals.
All of this is not to say that there is no "downside" to the finality policy.
Indeed, countervailing concerns have resulted in qualifications of the finality
litigation. Since the finality requirement is jurisdictional, the Court held that the Eighth Circuit
erred when it went on to decide the merits of this case, because the court had no jurisdiction
to hear the appeal of a non-final order. The Court reasoned that, if there is no jurisdiction to
hear the appeal, then there is no jurisdiction to decide the merits. Id. Accord Richardson-
Merrel Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 440-41 (1985) ("orders disqualifying counsel in civil cases,
like orders disqualifying counsel in criminal cases and orders denying a motion to disqualify in
civil cases, are not collateral orders subject to appeal as 'final judgments' within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.").
159. See generally 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3907 (1976)
(discussing purposes of finality); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 110.07
(same).
160. E.g., Missouri Pac. Joint Protective Bd. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 730 F.2d 533, 537 (8th
Cir. 1984), citing 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3907 (1976) (findings
of fact and application of generalized legal standards are the primary responsibility of the trial
courts).
161. See Partrederiet Treasure Saga v. Joy Mfg. Co., 804 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1986)
(denial of motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds is not appealable, because
"[n]on-appealability ... recognizes the wide discretion permitted trial courts in procedural
matters").
162. E.g., Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1985), citing 15 FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3907 (Supp. 1989) (most pretrial orders of district
judges are ultimately affirmed by appellate courts).
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requirement by statute, by rule, and by judicial decision. 63 Some rulings, a
preliminary injunction for example, may work an independent and irrepa-
rable harm during trial and may so profoundly affect the trial that the
appeal-reversal-retrial routine would be too little too late.164 Furthermore,
the liberal joinder rules in modern complex litigation give rise to rulings
which affect severable parties or claims and which do not influence the
remainder in a way that would manifest the evils of piecemeal review.
65
Finality is, after all, in the eyes of the beholder, and appellate judges should
and do have an eye for justice. 66
This is not meant to characterize the policy of finality as so self-contra-
dictory as to pose an insoluble dilemma. Nor are the rules of finality being
criticized as being unduly complex and uncertain or so malleable as to be
formless. What should be expected, rather, and what characterizes the
principles of appellate jurisdiction found in the statutes, rules, and court
decisions, is a kind of categorical balancing of the competing values, a
balance that in some circumstances favors awaiting a final judgment and
that in other circumstances favors allowing an interlocutory appeal.
B. The Final Decision Requirement
Section 1291 of Title 28, grants to the courts of appeals appellate juris-
diction to review "all final decisions," although that phrase is nowhere
defined in the United States Code. 67 Judicial interpretation provides a study
in contrast. At one extreme, since the statute does not refer to "judgments,"
it might be read to permit an appeal from every ruling or order-every
"decision"-of the district court. At the other extreme, the phrase might be
read to emphasize "final" and thus to require that the litigation in the
district court be literally and wholly complete. Courts have rejected both
extremes. 6 The first extreme would allow too many appeals and would
totally frustrate the policy of finality. The second extreme would be too
strict and would ignore the occasional need for immediate review of orders
with serious and direct consequences both in terms of unnecessary trial
proceedings and in terms of irreparable injury to rights that could not be
restored effectively by a later appeal. The resulting holdings on finality are
purposeful and pragmatic.
Lawyers, and lawyers who become judges, are prone to look for "good
language" in opinions to use. From their frequent quotation and citation,
163. See infra Part IV(B).
164. See infra Part II1(E).
165. See infra Parts Ill(C) & (D).
166. See infra Part III(B).
167. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
168. See generally 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3909 (1976)
(collecting leading finality decisions); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at
110.08-.08[3] (discussing general principles of finality).
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what follows are several numbered examples of some of the "best language"
on the final decision statute.
(1) A 'final decision' generally is one which ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. 69
This language is often cited, but does not say much. 70
Finality as a condition of review . . . has been departed from only when
observance of it would practically defeat the right to any review at all.' 7'
This language is much-cited in denying review.
(3) But even so circumscribed a legal concept as appealable finality has a
penumbral area .... [A] judgment directing immediate delivery of physical
property is reviewable and is to be deemed dissociated from a provision
for an accounting even though that is decreed in the same order. In effect,
such a controversy is a multiple litigation allowing review of the adjudi-
169. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (order denying motion by property
owners to vacate a "judgment" vesting title to condemned property in the Government which
was already in possession was not final and reviewable; the order left the question of compen-
sation undecided and an appeal would be improper piecemeal review). See also Local P-171,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Thompson Farms Co., 642 F.2d 1065,
1069 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233, as the "normal" standard of finality);
EEOC v. American Express Co., 558 F.2d 102, 103 (2d Cir. 1977) (court dismissed appeal on
ground that order declining to dismiss a complaint is not final order); John Thompson Beacon
Windows, Ltd. v. Ferro, Inc., 232 F.2d 366, 368 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (appeal dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction on the grounds that an order overruling motion to compel arbitration was not
a final order since it did not dispose of the whole case on the merits). But see Thompson
Mckinnon Securities, Inc. v. Salter, 873 F.2d 1397 (11 th Cir. 1989) (under 28 U.S.C. § 15(a)(1),
interlocutory orders refusing to compel arbitration are appealable-even though they are not
final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291).
170. For example, courts often use this language as an introduction to their analysis of
finality, but the language itself answers few questions. Instead, the typical analysis expands on
the Catlin introduction. See, e.g., Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 108 S. Ct. 1717, 1720
(1988). In Budinich, the Court cited the Catlin language at the beginning of its analysis. The
Court considered the question of whether a lower court's decision on the merits is a final
decision when "the recoverability or amount of attorney's fees for the litigation remains to be
determined." Id. The Catlin language was a mere starting point to the Court's conclusion that
the unresolved issue of attorney's fees does not prevent finality of the judgment on the merits,
in the interest of a uniform rule. Id. at 1721-22.
171. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-25 (1940) (holding order denying motion
to quash made by persons served with subpoenas duces tecum for appearance and production
of documents before a grand jury was not final and reviewable; witnesses could test subpoenas
by disobedience and appeal from a final contempt adjudication). See Flanagan v. United States,
465 U.S. 259, 263, 265 (1984). In Flanagan, the district court's pretrial disqualification of
defense counsel in criminal prosecution was not final and immediately appealable, thus the
court of appeals had no jurisdiction to review the order prior to the entry of final judgment
in the case. Id. (citing Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 324-25). The court explained that to qualify as
an exception to the finality rule, the trial court order must meet three conditions. Id. at 265.
First, the order must conclusively determine the disputed question; second, the order must
resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action; third, the order
must "be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Id. (citing Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)).
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cation which is concluded because it is independent of, and unaffected by,
another litigation with which it happens to be entangled. 72
This language is much-cited in allowing review.
(4) [T]he requirement of finality has not been met merely because the
major issues in a case have been decided and only a few loose ends remain
to be tied up-for example, where liability has been determined and all
that needs to be adjudicated is the amount of damages .... On the other
hand, if nothing more than a ministerial act remains to be done, such as
the entry of a judgment upon a mandate, the decree is regarded as
concluding the case and is immediately reviewable .... There have been
instances where the Court has entertained an appeal of an order that
otherwise might be deemed interlocutory, because the controversy had
proceeded to a point where a losing party would be irreparably injured if
review were unavailing. 73
This language, from a five-four holding, demonstrates the difficulty in close
cases.
(5) [The] struggle of the courts [requires] . . . sometimes choosing one
and sometimes another of.the considerations that always compete in the
question of appealability, the most important of which are the inconven-
ience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of
denying justice by delay on the other.' 4
172. Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124-26 (1945) (holding state
supreme court judgment ordering immediate delivery of physical possession of a radio station
and a continuation of the proceedings for an accounting was final and reviewable). See Universal
Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 101 n.4 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying the
"pragmatic approach" of Radio Station WOW, to find that a district court order which reversed
the final decision of the bankruptcy court was final and appealable for purposes of section
1293(b), notwithstanding remand to the bankruptcy court for an accounting); Sekaquaptewa v.
MacDonald, 575 F.2d 239, 243 (9th Cir. 1978) (partition order in land dispute between two
Indian Tribes, even though did not direct immediate delivery of property, effectively transferred
separate possession and use of lands previously held jointly, thus the order deprived Navajo of
use and was sufficiently final to be appealable).
173. Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 68 (1948) (footnotes omitted)
(five-four holding that order giving company three choices: to stop withdrawing gas or to
purchase from another company or to sell on behalf of another company-was not final and
reviewable because the election of any might substantially affect the questions presented for
review). See also Cinerama, Inc. v. Sweet Music S.A., 482 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1973) (appeal
from judgment for defendant for principal amount of its counterclaim was dismissed for lack
of appellate jurisdiction where issues remained on the amount of prejudgment interest).
174. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950) (holding earlier
decree disposing of party's claims but requiring further proceedings to divide judgment funds
among other parties had been final and reviewable; appeal taken from the later, clearly final
decree was too late to raise issues about earlier decree). See Gillespie v. United States Steel
Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964) (quoting Dickinson as a correct statement of the competing
considerations and noting that finality need not necessarily await "the last order possible to be
made in a case"). See also Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe, Co., 681 F.2d 1259, 1264
(11 th Cir. 1982) (wherein the court of appeals considered the inconvenience and cost of piecemeal
review on the one hand, and the danger of denying justice on the other, to conclude that a
court order directing special master to proceed with determination of back pay awards on
1989l
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This language identifies the essential considerations and the inevitable cate-
gorical balancing.
(6) The Court has adopted essentially practical tests for identifying those
judgments which are, and those which are not, to be considered 'final.' ...
A pragmatic approach to the question of finality has been considered
essential to the achievement of the 'just, speedy, and inexpensive deter-
mination of every action': the touchstones of federal procedure.'7-
The ultimate emphasis is on the pragmatic.
The Court's rejection of extremes inevitably results in a certain disharmony
in the precedents. Thus some holdings and opinions support a generous
attitude toward finality while others urge a stricter approach. Nonetheless,
this series of exemplars is not meant to suggest that finality determinations
are merely ad hoc. There are clear holdings of appealability and nonap-
pealability categorizing most every ruling which a district court conceivably
can make.' 76 In fact, the Supreme Court explicitly has warned against a case-
by-case approach.' 77 Therefore, care is required to find precedent from the
high Court and court of appeals' precedent to determine the finality of each
particular ruling. Only on those rare occasions when a prior holding does
not bind, do the finality policies and "good language" serve as adequate
guides.
What can one finally conclude from all of this? As Jerome Frank once
observed, "[tihere is, still, too little finality about 'finality."'' 7 8
C. The Collateral Order Doctrine
The Supreme Court has fashioned the collateral order doctrine in a discrete
line of cases interpreting the section 1291 requirement for a "final deci-
sion."1
79
individual basis met test of finality since effect of order killed class recovery entirely and left
open only small number of individual claims); Curlott v. Campbell, 598 F.2d 1175, 1179 (9th
Cir. 1979) (the court must balance the competing considerations and give "finality" a practical
construction).
175. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962) (footnotes omitted) (raised
at oral argument, the finality issue was resolved in favor of appealability of an order requiring
a divestiture of a subsidiary and providing that the parent company file with the court a detailed
plan for carrying out the divestiture). See also In re Mason, 709 F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir.
1983) (court had jurisdiction to review denial of motion to vacate entry of order for relief
because the unique nature of bankruptcy procedure dictates that the court take "a pragmatic
approach to the question of finality"); United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 314 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (orders to unseal documents which were seized during searches of churches were appealable
due in part to their "practical finality").
176. See generally 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at §§ 3910-3918
(1976); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 110.08-.16 (for general principles
governing when judgment is final).
177. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 439 (1985) ("This Court, however,
has expressly rejected efforts to reduce the finality requirement of § 1291 to a case-by-case
determination of whether a particular ruling should be subject to appeal."), citing Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
178. See United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 129 F.2d 678, 680 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 698 (1942).
179. See generally 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3911 (1976); 9
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Under this expansive interpretation, orders are labeled final and appealable
even though the ruling does not terminate the entire action or even any
significant part of it. The apparent finality is that the order is a final
determination of the issue in question. Appeal is allowed if, and only if: (1)
the matter involved is separate from and collateral to the merits; (2) the
matter is too important to be denied effective review; (3) review later by
appeal from a final judgment is not likely to be effective; and, (4) the matter
presents a serious and unsettled question.
The leading case on this point is Cohen v. Beneficial Industry Corp. 80 In
a stockholders' suit, the defendant corporation moved under state law to
require the plaintiff to post a bond for defendant's costs and attorney's fees
and then appealed from the denial of the motion. The Supreme Court held
the denial was appealable. In the Court's words:
This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determine
claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the
action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the
cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the
whole case is adjudicated. The Court has long given this provision of the
statute this practical rather than a technical construction .... Here it is
the right to security that presents a serious and unsettled question.'1'
The collateral order doctrine remains viable today. Recent decisions, how-
ever, seem to suggest a more restrictive attitude and some reluctance to find
appealability although some particular orders have been held to satisfy the
Cohen test. Consider a few more recent examples each way. The Court has
held in favor of appealability in challenges to: a pretrial order which imposed
on the defendants ninety percent of the costs of notifying the members of
the plaintiff class;' 2 an order denying a claim of immunity raised by a
defendant in a motion for summary judgment;' 3 and, an order granting a
motion to stay federal litigation to abstain pending similar state litigation.'1
4
The Court has held nonappealable: the determination that an action may
not go forward as a class action;" 5 an order refusing to disqualify opposing
counsel in a civil case;8 6 an order denying a motion to stay federal litigation
to abstain pending similar state litigation; 8 and an order denying a motion
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 1 110.10, 110.13[9] (for discussion of collateral
order doctrine and class action suits).
180. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
181. Id. at 546-47 (footnotes omitted).
182. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172 (1974).
183. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-30 (1985) (qualified immunity); Nixon v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U.S. 731, 741-43 (1983) (absolute immunity).
184. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 8-13 (1983).
185. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1978).
186. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373-78 (1981). See Flanagan v.
United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263-70 (1984) (same for order disqualifying criminal defense
attorney).
187. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988).
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to dismiss made on the ground that an extradited person was immune from
civil process. 8
The Court has refused to expand the collateral order doctrine into a purely
pragmatic approach to finality. Consistent with the formalism that generally
characterizes finality analysis, the Court has adhered to the factorial ap-
proach adopted in Cohen. Each factor must be taken into account, no one
factor predominates. Furthermore, each factor has a high threshold to be
satisfied, and, if any one factor is unsatisfied, then the test is not met. Even
a persuasive argument that the order sought to be appealed threatens an
injury that cannot effectively be remedied on a later appeal will not, by
itself, be enough. 8 9
D. The Twilight Zone Doctrine
The twilight zone doctrine, sometimes less pejoratively called "pragmatic
finality" or the "Gillespie doctrine," after the originating decision, is another
discrete, though tangential, line of analysis under section 1291.1 g° The key
is to distinguish language from holdings. Opinion language in this line of
decisions would end the finality requirement, if taken literally and if applied
frequently, although actual holdings which invoke this doctrine to permit an
appeal are rather rare. This line of precedent may be described as essentially
moribund but susceptible to some future revitalization.
The major significance of the twilight zone doctrine may be its potential
toward modulation of the final/nonfinal formulation. Two preliminary cau-
tions need be mentioned, however. First, the indefiniteness of the analysis
could allow the court of appeals something of a jurisdictional "wild-card"
to trump nearly any district court decision on a case-by-case basis. That
would avoid indirectly what the Supreme Court has refused to avoid directly:
the formalism of the final decision requirement in section 1291. For the
most part, however, the courts of appeals have not given in to that temp-
tation. Second, this is a peculiar area of finality in which the Supreme
Court's role to review state court decisions may differ from the role of the
courts of appeals to review district court decisions. So the precedents on
finality for the Supreme Court and for the courts of appeals should be, and
are understood to be, less interchangeable than usual.
The namesake and original decision is Gillespie v. United States Steel
Corp. 9'1 In a Jones Act case, the district court struck portions of the
complaint asserting claims under state law and an unseaworthiness claim, as
well as all claims for the benefit of the members of the family of the decedent
except his mother. Even though the district court refused to certify an
188. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517 (1988).
189. Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 374-79 (1987).
190. See generally 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3913 (1976); 9
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 110.12.
191. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
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interlocutory appeal, the plaintiff appealed and the court of appeals decided
the merits and affirmed. The Supreme Court reached the merits following
what might be characterized as a "Rod Serling script":
[O]ur cases long have recognized that whether a ruling is "final" within
the meaning of § 1291 is frequently so close a question that decision of
that issue either way can be supported with equally forceful arguments,
and that it is impossible to devise a formula to resolve all marginal cases
coming within what might be called the "twilight zone" of finality. Because
of this difficulty this Court has held that the requirement of finality is to
be given a "practical rather than a technical construction." . . . [I]n
deciding the question of finality the most important compelling consider-
ations are "the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one
hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the other."' 92
The experience in the courts of appeals is difficult to chronicle. As one
might expect from such an enigmatic opinion, Gillespie has been interpreted
in different ways by different courts of appeals. 93 Some panels simply have
balanced the policies for and against immediate appeal in the particular case.
Other panels have used the balancing approach to allow appeal from orders
that could have been placed within more traditional finality precedent or
have used the balancing approach to dismiss the appeal under the doctrine.1
94
192. Id. at 152-53.
193. See, e.g., McKnight v. Blanchard, 667 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1982) (court applied
"death knell" doctrine to find appealability of order which stayed criminal proceedings until
appellant's release from prison, even though, on its face, the order was neither final nor an
appealable collateral order, because so long a stay would have made it impossible for appellant
to produce witnesses and therefore effect of denial of appeal would effectively deny litigant his
day in court); accord Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 681 F.2d 1259, 1264 (11 th Cir.
1982); Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir. 1981); Sherman v. American Fed'n of
Musicians, 588 F.2d 1313, 1315 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1979); Wescott v.
Impresas Armadoras, S.A. Panama, 564 F.2d 875, 881 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. 58.16
Acres of Land, More or Less in Clinton County, 478 F.2d 1055, 1061 (7th Cir. 1973). See
generally 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3913 (1976).
194. Some courts apply the Gillespie balancing approach where a second theory also estab-
lishes finality. See In re Exennium, Inc., 715 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir. 1983) (where the court
granted the appeal under Gillespie reasoning and 28 U.S.C. § 1293 which permits the appellate
courts to hear questions conclusive of the ultimate outcome in bankruptcy cases); Smith v.
Eggar, 655 F.2d 181, 184-85 (9th Cir. 1981) (where the court recognized the order as sufficiently
injunctive to justify jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a)(l) and, if the order was not
sufficiently injunctive, the court found the order fundamental to litigation such that "policy
and common sense dictate Gillespie to rule"); Virginia v. Tenneco, Inc., 538 F.2d 1026, 1030
(4th Cir. 1976) (although a temporary restraining order is not normally appealable, the court
found this order appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 since the appellant entered the order after
a full hearing in which all concerned parties had fully participated and the order "bespeaks of
the nature of a preliminary injunction .. .rather than an order entered ex parte or on less
than a full presentation of the facts." Also, under Gillespie, in weighing the practical effect
the court found the order essentially granting the plaintiff all the relief sought). Some courts
apply the Gillespie balancing approach to dismiss the appeal. See also Freeman v. Califano,
574 F.2d 264, 267-68 (5th Cir. 1978) (where the court dismissed the appeal under the Gillespie
approach, finding no threat of denying justice to anyone with the dismissal); Williams v.
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The great potential for expansion of appellate jurisdiction feared for in this
approach has not been realized. Perhaps because the twilight zone appears
so boundless, the courts of appeals have been tentative in their applications,
usually preferring to use the doctrine to buttress holdings of appealability
based primarily on other grounds. The Gillespie holding, in retrospect, may
be best understood as an efficient and appropriate rationalization only, as
was true in the Gillespie case itself, when it is invoked as a justification after
the court of appeals has reached the merits and has fully decided the appeal
based on a mistaken belief of finality.19
E. Partial Final Judgments
Rule 54(b) certification is yet another application of section 1291. Rule
54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure facilitates the entry of judgment
on one or more but fewer than all the claims or as to one or more but fewer
than all the parties.' The rule provides that such a partial final judgment
"is subject to revision at any time before entry of judgment adjudicating all
the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties."' 97 Because modern
federal procedure allows for such liberal joinder of claims and parties,
contemporary civil actions often become very complex. By allowing for a
partial final judgment and an immediate appeal, the rule is a response to
the legitimate concern that delay of any appeal until the entire complex
action is complete could result in injustice. The successful party thus is
relieved of the effects of any delay and from the need to participate in the
extended trial proceeding. The rule allows a prompt appeal and provides
some certainty for the appellate procedure in today's complex suits. In doing
so, the rule expressly rejects the notion that an entire case is the judicial
unit for appealability. However, the rule reaffirms and incorporates the
"final decision" requirement, as it must be satisfied for the partial judg-
ment. 198
Generally, Rule 54(b) may be followed if, and only if: (1) more than one
claim is presented or multiple parties are involved and the matter in question
is separable; (2) the district court issues a certificate expressly determining
that there is no just reason for delay; and, (3) the district court expressly
directs the entry of a Rule 54(b) judgment which is a final and ultimate
disposition of the matter.
Mumford, 511 F.2d 363, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 828 (1975) (court dismissed
appeal on the certification of a class action since the individual plaintiffs had sufficient incentive
to continue the suit without class action certification).
195. 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3913 (1976); 9 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 110.12.
196. See generally 10 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at §§ 2656-2661
(1983); 6 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 157, at 54.23[1]-[21, 54.28[2].
197. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). See Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co.,
860 F.2d 1441, 1445 (7th Cir. 1988) (construing Rule 54(b)).
198. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 431-38 (1956).
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Each of these requirements can be a catch-point. In the absence of the
express determination and direction in a Rule 54(b) certificate, any order
adjudicating fewer than all claims against all parties normally is subject to
any revision by the district court until the entry of a final and comprehensive
judgment. The entry of a Rule 54(b) certificate is not automatic or required
and is committed initially to the district court's discretion. Without a Rule
54(b) certificate, an appeal must be dismissed unless the judgment is ap-
pealable on other grounds. The court of appeals is not bound to decide the
appeal, however, even when there is a certificate. The appeal under a
certificate will nevertheless be dismissed if the order is not final, if the
threshold multiplicity does not exist or if, despite the deference owed, the
court of appeals concludes that the district court abused the discretion to
issue the certificate.
The Supreme Court elaborated on the respective roles of the district court
and the court of appeals in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co.199
The plaintiff sued on various claims for breach of multiple contracts, in-
cluding a demand for a liquidated balance that admittedly remained unpaid.
Defendant filed counterclaims based on the same contracts. On a motion
for summary judgment, the district court rejected the defendant's only
defense against payment of the unpaid balance and entered a Rule 54(b)
judgment on that claim. The court of appeals dismissed for an abuse of
discretion because the unresolved counterclaims made the certificate inap-
propriate.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held the Rule 54(b)
certificate had been properly issued by the district court. The Court opined
that Rule 54(b) treatment should not be reserved for only the extreme cases,
but also should not issue merely upon the request of the parties. The "no
just reason for delay" element is to be emphasized. This element has two
components: the interest of judicial administration and the equities of the
parties. The former component requires the thoughtful scrutiny of the court
of appeals within contemplation of the general finality principle. The latter
component, by contrast, is peculiarly within the district court's informed
discretion, to be exercised on a fact-bound basis.
The chief purpose of the rule is to accommodate the final decision re-
quirement to complex litigation with multiple parties or multiple claims. This
functional approach to Rule 54(b) assures flexibility to accomplish immediate
enforcement or to allow immediate appellate review. 2°°
199. 446 U.S. 1 (1980).
200. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956). The Mackey court explained
that Rule 54(b) does not relax the finality requirement but does provide a practical means of
permitting appeal taken from one or more final decisions on individual claims, in multiple
claims actions, without waiting for final decisions to be rendered on all claims in the case. Id.
at 434-35. "To meet the demonstrated need for flexibility the district court is used as a
'dispatcher.' It is permitted to determine, in the first instance, the appropriate time when each
'final decision' upon 'one or more but less than all' of the claims in a multiple claims action
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IV. APPEALS FROM INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS-CIVIL
A. Generally
This Part chronicles the widening statutory exceptions to the requirement
of finality. 20  Both the general policy and the statute equate appealability
with finality. At one time, interlocutory orders were just that-interlocutory.
Not until 1891-the year the circuit courts were created-was there a provision
for an interlocutory appeal, and that covered only orders granting or con-
tinuing injunctions. 20 2 Statutory exceptions to the general rule of finality,
however, have grown in number and significance ever since. 203
. As is true of the federal appellate power to review final decisions, juris-
diction over interlocutory appeals is entirely a creature of statute. Inexorably,
Congress has widened the appellate power. The Supreme Court has explained
the process: "[Exceptions] seem plainly to spring from a developing need to
permit litigants to effectually challenge interlocutory orders of serious, per-
haps irreparable, consequence. When the pressure rises to a point that
influences Congress, legislative remedies are enacted. ' ' 204 The various statu-
tory exceptions demonstrate a congressional recognition that a too rigid
adherence to the finality requirement can work a severe hardship within the
litigation and beyond. Furthermore, a categorical approach to appealability
can frustrate the very policies sought to be served by finality.
Because these provisions create exceptions to the general history and
tradition against interlocutory appeals, the statutes are narrow in language,
is ready for appeal." Id. at 435. See also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521
F.2d 360, 363 (3d Cir. 1975) (rule 54(b) attempts to strike a balance between piecemeal litigation
and the need to make review available at a time that best serves the needs of the parties). But
see Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Fore River Ry. Co., 861 F.2d 322, 325 (1st Cir. 1988). In Fore
River, the court dismissed part of the appeal because the district court improperly certified its
judgment under Rule 54(b). The court explained that to qualify as a 54(b) judgment, the court
must first decide if the judgment is final, and second, must ascertain that no reason for delay
existed. In this case, the court found reason for delay in light of the fact that the same parties
on appeal remained contestants below. Id. Accord Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 860 F.2d 1441, 1445 (7th Cir. 1988) (court independently considered its Rule
54(b) jurisdiction and dismissed appeal for lack thereof).
201. See generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3920 (1977); 9
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 110.16.
202. Act of March 3, 1891, § 7, 26 Stat. 826, 828. See supra Part I(B).
203. See Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83 n.8 (1981) ("Because rigid
application [of the finality rule] was found to create undue hardship in some cases . . .Congress
created certain exceptions " including, among others, appeal as of right from interlocutory
orders of the district court and appeal from district court orders refusing injunction requests);
Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822, 829-30 (2d Cir. 1963)
(Friendly, J., dissenting) (noting statutory exceptions, found in section 129 of the Judicial Code
of 1911, 36 Stat. 1134, where an injunction is granted, continued, refused, or dissolved by an
interlocutory order, or an application to dissolve an injunction is refused), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 944 (1964).
204. Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955) (footnote omitted).
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narrow in interpretation, and narrow in application. It is important to note
that there is much less "play in the joints" here than there is in the "final
decision" provision in section 1291. Once jurisdiction obtains, however, the
interlocutory appeal brings before the court of appeals all aspects of the
case illuminated by the order on review. 20 5
Tautologically, interlocutory orders may be divided into reviewable orders
and nonreviewable orders. 206 "Nonreviewable" here has something of a
temporal connotation. An interlocutory order that is not immediately re-
viewable under the statutes considered in this section might serve as the basis
for an immediate application for an extraordinary writ 207 and, certainly,
would be cognizable on any eventual appeal from a final judgment. Inter-
locutory appeals of reviewable orders may be subdivided into entitled inter-
locutory appeals and permissive interlocutory appeals. The former are brought
in the discretion of the party; the latter require court permission. One last
point bears emphasis: so-called entitled interlocutory appeals are discretion-
ary with the appellant, not mandatory. Should a party decline to take
advantage of the possibility of an immediate appeal, the issue still may be
raised on appeal from the eventual final judgment.
B. Entitled Interlocutory Appeals
Section 1292(a) of Title 28208 provides the courts of appeals with jurisdiction
of appeals as of right in three types of interlocutory orders dealing with
injunctions, receivers, and admiralty matters. Each type of entitled interloc-
utory appeal- sometimes referred to as "interlocutory appeals as of right"-
will be discussed briefly here.
Subsection (1) of section 1292(a) defines an entitled interlocutory appeal
of an order "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunc-
tions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions. ' 20 9 A prolific source of
appeals, this subsection accounts for the largest number of interlocutory
appeals, entitled or permissive. Once obtained, appellate review extends to
all matters necessary to determine the propriety of the order, going so far
as to review the merits to order a dismissal. 10 A working definition of an
205. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 755-
57 (1986).
206. Here the terms "reviewable" and "non-reviewable" are preferred to the terms "ap-
pealable" and "non-appealable" because the former pair distinguish orders based on the power
of the court of appeals, and the latter pair may be misunderstood to be in the complete control
of the litigants. An appeal from an order might be taken improperly to require the court of
appeals to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Such an appeal may broadly and imprecisely be
thought of as "appealable" but could not be mistaken as "reviewable."
207. See infra Part V(C).
208. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1982).
209. Id. § 1292(a)(1). See generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at
§§ 3921-24 (1977); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 1 110.20-.2015].
210. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 755-57.
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"injunction" for purposes of section 1292(a)(1) is an order addressed to a
party which is enforceable by contempt "and designed to accord or protect
some or all of the substantive relief sought" in the action.21 Based on the
duration of the order and whether there was notice and a hearing, and on
the nature of the showing made, the courts of appeals distinguish between
preliminary injunctions (which are appealable) and temporary restraining
orders (which are not appealable). 2 2 Denial of an injunction may be implicit
as well as express. For example, if the order has the practical effect of
refusing injunctive relief, there is an entitlement to an interlocutory appeal
so long as there are immediate and serious consequences. 213 In a recent
holding, the Supreme Court eliminated an anomalous exception to make the
general rule more whole: an order by a district court which relates only to
the conduct or progress of litigation before that court is not considered an
injunction. The Court thus finally stopped distinguishing the appealability
of various stays based on irrelevant remnants of the dichotomy between
equity and law. 214
In characterizing orders for appealability under section 1292(a)(1), the view
taken by the district court necessarily is the beginning point of analysis. An
apparent belief by the district court and the parties that the subject order
was in the nature of injunctive relief goes a long way toward a finding of
appealability. Nonetheless, because the label used itself does not control,
circuit court precedent elaborates on the definition of an interlocutory order
"granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving . . . or refusing to
dissolve or modify" an injunction. 215 The growing understanding is that this
subsection is to be saved for orders of serious, perhaps irreparable, conse-
211. 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3922 (1977) (citing International
Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 406 (2d Cir. 1963)).
212. E.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 86 n.58 (1974) (the court found that the
temporary restraining order granted by the district court, which continued beyond the time
permissible, should be treated as a preliminary injunction).
213. Compare Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480-82 (1978)
(denial of class action status not appealable because it would not have an 'irreparable' effect")
with Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 86-90 (1981) (refusal to approve consent
decree which would have barred racial discrimination in hiring is appealable because the
petitioners, in establishing that the refusal precluded them from settling on their own terms
and precluded an immediate restructuring of respondent's transfer and promotional policies,
showed that they would suffer a "serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence").
214. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988) (rejecting the
Enelow-Ettelson rule, by which a federal court order regarding a stay of its own proceedings
was appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a)(1) only if the action was by its nature an action at
law and the order was based on an equitable defense or counterclaim), overruling Ettelson v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942) and Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293
U.S. 379 (1935). See generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3923
(1977); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 110.20[3].
215. See generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3924 (1977); 9
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 110.20[1]-[2].
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quence so as not to compromise unduly the basic policy against piecemeal
appeals.
21 6
Subsection (2) of section 1292(a) defines a second entitled interlocutory
appeal of "orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up re-
ceiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as
directing sales or other disposals of property. ' 217 A practice of strict con-
struction has limited this subsection to its literal meaning.218 A character of
equity, a receiver is appointed by the court with managerial powers over the
property. 21 9 Much of the litigation under this subsection considers whether
an order does in fact create a receivership. The analogy then to subsection%
(1) and injunctions is obvious. The most important textual difference is that
subsection (2) does not permit an appeal if the district court refuses to act,
while a grant or a denial of an injunction does trigger an entitled appeal
under subsection (1). Thus, a refusal to appoint, in the first place, is not
appealable under subsection (2). An order "refusing orders to wind up [a]
216. See Switzerland Cheese Ass'n, Inc. v. E. Horne's Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 24 (1966)
(Court cautions that section 1292(a) must be "approach[ed] somewhat gingerly lest a floodgate
be opened that brings into the exception many pretrial orders"); Administrative Mgmt. Serv.,
Ltd. v. Royal Am. Managers, Inc., 854 F.2d 1272, 1279 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (court refused immediate
appeal of denial of motion to compel arbitration under section 1292(a)(1) as the parties could
obtain relief upon review after trial and thus had not suffered irreparable consequences);
Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (where the court granted the appeal of
the district court's order denying a class certification motion since a review of a denial of a
preliminary injunction request would be seriously impaired without effective review of this
order); McNasby v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. 832 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1987) (where the court
recognized that the Supreme Court has cautioned that section 1292(a)(1) "must be narrowly
construed to conform to ... policy against piecemeal litigation"), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1112
(1988); Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1173-74 (7th Cir. 1985) (where the court granted
the appeal of a district court's refusal to approve a consent decree since the appellant specifically
showed that the order caused irreparable harm in that it imposed an indefinite delay on the
protection of pension rights). See generally Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480
U.S. 370, 379 (1987) (respondent's appeal from a district court order denying a request to
intervene but granting limited permissive intervention failed for lack of serious consequences);
Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480 (1978) (district court's denial of
petitioner's request for class certification was not appealable because it would not have an
irreparable effect).
217. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2) (1982).
218. See lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1020 (2d Cir. 1975) (where the court denied
the appeal of an order approving an expenditure since the statute applies only to the refusal
to grant an application to complete a receivership by sale or other disposition); United States
v. Chelsea Towers, Inc., 404 F.2d 329, 330 (3d Cir. 1968) (where the court dismissed the appeal
from an order requiring escrow accounts and security deposits be turned over to a receiver);
Belleair Hotel Co. v. Mabry, 109 F.2d 390, 391 (5th Cir. 1940) (where the court denied the
appeal of an order authorizing the receiver to lease a tourist hotel and other buildings in his
possession since it was not an order refusing to take appropriate steps to wind up receivership).
See generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3925 (1977); 7 (Part 2)
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 46, at 66.04[3].
219. See FED. R. Civ. P. 66 (receivers appointed by federal courts). See generally 12 FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 2983 (1973); 7 (Part 2) MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 46, at 66.0411].
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receivership," which is made appealable under subsection (2),220 is a refusal
to end a receivership that has become unnecessary or has been completed.
Subsection (3) of section 1292(a) defines a third entitled interlocutory
appeal from decrees "determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to
admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." ' 22' The
courts of appeals, even panels of the same circuit, cannot seem to agree on
whether this provision, which is a holdover from before the 1966 merger of
the admiralty and civil procedures, should be read broadly or narrowly. 222
There is no readily apparent reason why admiralty cases deserve a signifi-
'cantly more liberal practice of interlocutory appeals. No matter, for a few
accepted rules will suffice for the present consideration. An "admiralty case"
is either a case cognizable only within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the district court or a case which falls within some other head of federal
jurisdiction as well as the federal admiralty jurisdiction and is nominated as
an admiralty case. 223
C. Permissive Interlocutory Appeals
Section 1292(b) of Title 28 provides:
(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not
otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,
he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which
would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its
discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application
is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided,
however, [t]hat application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay pro-
ceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of
Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.2 4
First adopted in 1958, this provision is the latest statutory qualification
of the general requirement for finality. 25 It is best understood as a compro-
mise between, on the one hand, those who were committed to finality and
220. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2) (1982).
221. Id. § 1292(a)(3).
222. Compare Walter E. Heller & Co. v. O/S Sonny V, 595 F.2d 968, 971 (5th Cir. 1979)
(giving section 1292(a)(3) a broad reading) with Hollywood Marine, Inc. v. M/V Artie James,
755 F.2d 414, 416 (5th Cir. 1985) (reading section 1292(a)(3) narrowly).
223. See Borne v. A & P Boat Rentals No. 4, Inc., 755 F.2d 1131, 1133 (5th Cir. 1985)
(where the court denied the appeal since the plaintiff "prayed for trial by jury, he did not
invoke admiralty jurisdiction and he made no reference to FED. R. Crv. P. 9(h)"). See generally
16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3927 (1977); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 110.1913].
224. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1986) (emphasis in original). See generally Redish, The Pragmatic
Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 89 (1975).
225. See generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, § at 3929 (1977); 9
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 110.22-.22[5].
[Vol. 39:235
TO WARD A UNIFIED THEOR Y
hostile to interlocutory appeals and, on the other hand, those who favored
giving the courts of appeals discretionary jurisdiction to review any and all
interlocutory appeals. Given the docket explosion experienced since 1958 by
the courts of appeals, it is not likely that this particular debate will be
rejoined anytime soon. Indeed, current suggestions in favor of discretionary
jurisdiction for the courts of appeals would move in the other direction to
make even appeals from final judgments a matter of grace, in order to cope
with burgeoning appellate dockets.22 6 Furthermore, the experience under
section 1292(b) does not demonstrate any pent-up pressure for further leg-
islative relaxation of the finality policy.
Obviously, section 1292(b) is the most explicit departure from the general
policy in favor of finality and against interlocutory appeals.127 While the
available statistics do not disclose the frequency with which this provision is
invoked and denied in the district courts, only an estimated 100 appeals are
brought under section 1292(b) each year. 22 The provision therefore goes
largely unused, considering that there are more than 35,000 federal appeals
filed each year. Perhaps, appellate attitudes influence this disuse; approxi-
mately one-half of the appeals that are attempted under this section are
refused. 229 While both legislative history and case law support the attitude
that section 1292(b) should be saved for the rare and exceptional order, the
run of actual applications does not adhere to a narrow interpretation with
an absolute consistency. The certification by the district court and the
permission to appeal by the court of appeals, each independent evaluations,
for the most part follow the straightforward procedure and criteria of the
statute.
2
1
0
The criteria in the statute are rather straightforward in summary, although
their application may become more subtle and the outcomes are highly
eclectic. 23 Primarily, there must be "an order." The district court must
226. Lay, A Proposal for Discretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeals, 34 Sw. L.J.
1151, 1152 (1981).
227. See 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3929 (1977).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See FED. R. App. P. 5. See generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note
41, at § 3930 (1977); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 110.22[2]-.22[5].
231. Compare In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982) (where
the court explained that appeals under section 1292(b) would be allowed in those exceptional
cases where the appeal would avoid protracted and expensive litigation) with Cates v. United
States, 451 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1971) (where the court explained appeals would be allowed
based on equity and the judge's good conscience). Compare Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General
Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 844, 845 (2d Cir. 1964) (court denied appeal on question of whether
plaintiff could collect damages for costs it had passed on to its customers) with Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1964) (court allowed same type
of appeal without comment on the jurisdictional issue). See generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3931 (1977); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at
110.2212].
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enter the predicate order and decide the issue to be certified. 32 Whether to
enter the separate certificate is in the discretion of the district court, and it
may be entered sua sponte or on motion; there is no set form. The order
also must be "not otherwise appealable. " 23 3 Matters "otherwise appealable"
include outright final decisions and the equivalents to final decisions; 234 a
Rule 54(b) certificate may be optional with a section 1292(b) certificate;235
and, a section 1292(b) certificate is preferred over an extraordinary writ. 236
The "controlling question of law ' 237 criterion means that factual questions
do not qualify and that appeals from the exercise of district court discretion
are not ordinarily permitted. The legal question must be central and impor-
tant to the litigation. There must be a "substantial ground for difference of
opinion. '' 38 An example of an appropriate occasion might be an issue of
first impression in a circuit on which there is a conflict among the other
courts of appeals. There should be some doubt on the issue. The possibility
of avoiding trial proceedings or, at least, significantly simplifying pretrial or
trial proceedings, is enough to satisfy the next related criterion that the
interlocutory appeal "materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation." Finally, once the district court issues the certificate, the court of
appeals "may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal. ' 239 This last
criterion obliges the reviewing court to evaluate the prudence of the district
court in issuing the certificate somewhat analogously to the exercise of
discretion on the part of the court of appeals to grant an extraordinary
writ. 240 But more than this, the court of appeals is to exercise an independent
discretion by taking into account factors beyond the proper contemplation
of the district court, such as the state of the appellate docket. This appellate
discretion seems wide open.
All of the criteria are to be figured into the calculi of the district court
and of the court of appeals, in turn, considered against the background
purposes of section 1292(b). Once granted, the scope of review is closely
limited to the order appealed from and the issue justifying the certification. 2'
V. REVIEW BY WRIT
A. Generally
Proceedings considered in this Part are formally commenced by an original
application to the court of appeals. 242 This form of original jurisdiction may
232. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
233. Id.
234. See supra Parts III(B), (C) & (D).
235. See supra Part Il(E).
236. See infra Part V(C).
237. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See supra Part V(C). See generally Note, Section 1292(b): Eight Years of Undefined
Discretion, 54 GEo. L.J. 940 (1966).
241. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 676-78 (1987).
242. See 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3932 (1977).
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be considered a remnant of the early history of the circuit courts with their
hybrid appellate and original jurisdiction. 24 Broadly considered, however,
the power to issue writs should be characterized as an appellate power. 24
More metaphysical issues concerning the inherent power of the courts of
appeals are preempted, for the most part, by specific statutory authorizations
to issue the writ of habeas corpus, to grant all writs necessary or appropriate
in aid of their jurisdiction, and to impose appropriate sanctions. 245
B. Relief in the Nature of Habeas Corpus
History informs an understanding of habeas jurisdiction. 246 The old circuit
courts, part original and part appellate tribunals, had jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas corpus. 247 The Evarts Act of 1891 created additional circuit
judgeships and gave all circuit judges habeas jurisdiction. 24s The 1911 legis-
lation, 249 however, ended the trial jurisdiction of the circuit courts along
with their habeas jurisdiction. The "new" 1911 courts of appeals were not
given the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus, apart from the all writs
statute. 20 Nor have the courts of appeals qua courts ever been given power
to issue such a writ. Consequently, the historical anomaly persists to the
present day that the courts of appeals lack power to grant the writ, although
individual circuit judges do possess that authority. 251 Section 2241 of Title
243. See supra Part I(B).
244. See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 582 (1943) ("the historic use of writs of
prohibition and mandamus directed by an appellate to an inferior court has been to exert the
revisory appellate power over the inferior court"); Ex parte Crane, 30 U.S. (Pet.) 190, 193
(1831) ("a mandamus to an inferior court of the United States, is in the nature of appellate
jurisdiction"). See also Berger, The Mandamus Power of the United States Courts of Appeals:
A Complex and Confused Means of Appellate Control, 31 BUFF. L. REV. 37 (1982) (addressing
use of mandamus as an internal judicial control device).
245. See supra, Part I(C). See generally Bell, The Federal Appellate Courts and the All Writs
Act, 23 Sw. L.J. 858 (1969).
246. See L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 18 (1981).
247. Prior to the All Writs Act, Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 granted federal
courts the power to issue extraordinary writs in aid of their respective jurisdiction. See Bell,
supra note 245, at 859. Section 14 provided that "all the ... courts of the United States, shall
have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially
provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions,
and agreeable to the principles and usages of law .... Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat.
73, 81-82.
248. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
249. Act of March 11, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, 36 Stat. 1087.
250. The All Writs Act, as now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982), is the direct descendent
of section 14 of the First Judiciary Act of Sept. 24. 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82. The 1948
recodification of the All Writs Act did not affect the power of the courts of appeals to issue
writs of mandamus in aid of their jurisdiction. See LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S.
249 (1957).
251. See Parker v. Sigler, 419 F.2d 827, 828 (8th Cir. 1969) (courts of appeals are given no
jurisdiction to entertain original petitions for habeas corpus and are without jurisdiction to
entertain such, but individual circuit judges do have jurisdiction over original habeas corpus
petitions). See also FED. R. App. P. 22(a) advisory committee notes (a court of appeals has no
jurisdiction as a court to grant an original writ of habeas corpus).
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28, authorizes "the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts
and any circuit judge" to issue the writ of habeas corpus. 25 2 The federal
remedy for state prisoners repeats that empowerment, 253 and the federal
remedy for federal prisoners authorizes application in the sentencing court
with an appeal to the court of appeals "as from a final judgment." '254 But
the jurisdiction over habeas corpus vested in the individual circuit judge has
small practical significance. The statute authorizes a transfer of the appli-
cation for habeas corpus to "the district court having jurisdiction to entertain
it.' '255 Circuit judges thus follow the practice of Supreme Court justices and
decline to entertain original petitions in most cases. 25 6 Nonetheless, the power
to issue the writ of habeas corpus remains part of the jurisdiction of the
circuit judge.257
C. "All Writs Necessary or Appropriate"
Writ lore is a somewhat murky tradition in federal appellate procedure. 28
Section 1651(a) of Title 28, the "All Writs Act" provides, in part: "all courts
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate
in aid of their respective jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and prin-
ciples of law." 25 9 This original jurisdiction allows for interlocutory review
of district court orders through issuance of extraordinary writs by the court
252. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1982).
253. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1982) (requirement of certificate
of probable cause to appeal); FED. R. App. P. 22(b).
254. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982).
255. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b) (1982).
256. E.g., Henderson v. Missouri, 661 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1981) (court transferred petition
for habeas corpus to district court with directions that the petition be dismissed for failure to
exhaust state remedies). See FED. R. App. P. 22(a) ("If application is made to a circuit judge,
the application will ordinarily be transferred to the appropriate district court"). See also 16
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3968 (1977) (discussing same).
257. See Ojeda Rios v. Wigen, 863 F.2d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 1988) (Chambers opinion of
Newman, J.) (where a prisoner's petition for habeas corpus was not in aid of the court's
appellate jurisdiction, it was appropriate for consideration by an individual judge and not by
a panel); Zimmerman v. Spears, 565 F.2d 310, 316 (5th Cir. 1977) (although an individual
judge of the courts of appeal has jurisdiction to entertain an original petition for habeas corpus,
the court rejected petitioner's suggestion that a single judge consider the petition because it was
not the ordinary procedure contemplated by FED. R. App. P. 22); Porter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d
827, 828 (8th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (although individual circuit judges, approved by the courts
of appeals, have jurisdiction to entertain an original habeas corpus petition, the ordinary
procedure under FED. R. App. P. 22(a) is to transfer an original habeas corpus application to
the district court). In Porter, the district court had already considered the issue raised in
petitioner's application, consequently the petition was dismissed by the court of appeals for
want of jurisdiction. Id. See generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at
§ 3968 (1977); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 222.01-.04.
258. See generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at §§ 3932-3934
(1977); 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 110.26,.28.
259. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982).
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of appeals. Mandamus and prohibition are most often used, although "all
writs" is meant to include certiorari, habeas corpus, and even a generic no-
name writ. 260 In contrast to the restraint that characterizes the jurisdictional
determination, the courts of appeals generally exhibit a rather relaxed attitude
'toward the form of the writ and its actual issuance.
The statute authorizes the courts of appeals to issue writs in aid of their
jurisdiction. 26 At a minimum, then, the matter must fall within the potential
jurisdiction of the court of appeals. Writs are deemed extraordinary 262 and,
by axiom, will not be used as a mere substitute for review, 263 although in
doubtful circumstances sometimes a single appellate filing will seek an ex-
traordinary writ and appellate review in the alternative. 264 The writ must be
necessary to assert appellate supervision which cannot later be asserted
effectively after an otherwise appealable order, or to remove an obstruction
to subsequent appellate review. Most often, a writ will issue to prevent a
district court from acting beyond its jurisdiction or to compel a district court
to take an action that it lacks power to withhold. 265 While rarely exercised,
260. See 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 110.26 & n.23. The particular
label attached to the petition should be unimportant, however, so long as the relief sought is
clearly set out. See Ex parte Simmons, 247 U.S. 231 (1918).
261. See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943) (authority of circuit courts of
appeals to issue mandamus is restricted to cases in which the writ is in aid of appellate
jurisdiction).
262. See Kerr v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California, 426
U.S. 394 (1976) (remedy of mandamus within the federal court system is a drastic one, to be
invoked only in extraordinary situations, amounting to a judicial "usurpation of power");
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953) (the supplementary review power
conferred on the courts by congress in the All Writs Act is meant to be used only in exceptional
cases where there is a clear abuse of discretion or usurpation of judicial power); Ex parte
Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947) (as extraordinary remedies, writs are reserved for really
extraordinary causes).
263. See Bankers Life & Casualty, 346 U.S. at 379 (extraordinary writs cannot be used as a
substitute for appeal, even though hardship may result from delay, and perhaps unnecessary
trial, and whatever may be done without the writ may not be done with it); Roche v. Evaporated
Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. at 21 (mandamus may not ordinarily be resorted to as a mode of review
where a statutory method of appeal has been prescribed, or to review an appealable decision
of record).
264. E.g., Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 104-07 (1967) (vacated writ of mandamus
issued by court of appeals where the record on review revealed no circumstances calling for
the 'drastic and extraordinary' nature of the mandamus remedy"); Roche v. Evaporated Milk
Ass'n., 319 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1943) (reversed court of appeals' issuance of a writ of mandamus
where the district court's decision involved no abuse of judicial power, since "[oin issuing the
writ the court of appeals below has done no more than substitute mandamus for an appeal
contrary to the statutes and the policy of Congress").
265. See 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3933 (1977). See also
Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943) ("traditional use of the writ in aid
of appellate jurisdiction . . . has been to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its
prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so");
Three J Farms, Inc. v. Alton Box Board Co., 609 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1979) (mandamus
appropriate in aid of appellate jurisdiction to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of
its prescribed jurisdiction).
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this authority is by no measure weak: the holdings admit to a naked power
to review immediately even an order that could be reviewed effectively on
later appeal.
266
The extraordinary nature of the writs is underscored by the discretion
surrounding their issuance. 267 The discretion of the court of appeals to
exercise the power defines the proper circumstances in which to grant a writ.
But that discretion defines particular circumstances even more clearly in
which to deny a writ. Writs are not entitled appeals, as are reviews of final
decisions and section 1292(a) interlocutory appeals. The characteristic of
restraint of discretion, of a power properly withheld, comes from the com-
mon law history of the writs and is reinforced, of course, by the notion of
limited federal jurisdiction. Although the phrase "clear and indisputable" is
used to describe the rights protected by extraordinary writs, 6 that phrase
does not establish a threshold of certainty. 269 The issue on review may be
doubtful and difficult and yet still justify a writ. However, a writ will not
issue to determine the merits of the ruling that has been withheld, 270 but will
issue to compel a district court to rule on a matter which has been improperly
deferred. 27' Thus, a writ does not direct the district court to rule one way
or the other but only to cease withholding a ruling.
The extraordinary writs are the vehicle for the exercise of two important
and distinct responsibilities of the federal appellate courts. The courts of
appeals hold both a supervisory authority and an advisory authority over
the district courts in the federal judicial hierarchy.2 72 The courts of appeals
266. E.g., La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 255 (1957) (since court of appeals
could at some stage of antitrust proceedings entertain appeal therein, it had power, in proper
circumstances, to issue writs of mandamus to compel district judge to vacate interlocutory
orders referring such cases to a master for trial).
267. See Kerr v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California, 426
U.S. 394, 402 (1976) (issuance of the writ is in large part a matter of discretion with the court
to which the petition is addressed); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943)
(common law writs, like equitable remedies, may be granted or withheld in the court's sound
discretion). See also Thirteenth Regional Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 54 F.2d 78
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (court has the authority to refrain from issuing a writ of mandamus, for the
exercise of the power of mandamus is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court). See generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3933 (1977); 9
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 110.26.
268. See Kerr, 426 U.S. at 394 (party seeking issuance of writ of mandamus must have no
other adequate means to attain the relief he desires and must satisfy burden of showing that
his right to issuance of the writ is "clear and indisputable").
269. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980). See also 16 FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3933 (Supp. 1987); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 84, at 110.28.
270. See, e.g., In re Montes, 77 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1983); I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co. v.
Becker, 343 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1965); Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Kent, 309 F.2d 891
(6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 372 U.S. 982 (1962).
271. See 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3933 (1977).
272. 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3934 (1977); 9 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 110.28.
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advise the district courts on difficult and novel issues which cannot or should
not await final appeal, and they supervise the district courts by remedying
unusual categories of error. 273 Still, the courts of appeals need to be sensitive
to the potential for abuse in the writ procedure, by which a district judge
becomes a litigant as the respondent. 274 Furthermore, although there may be
a case-by-case preference for a section 1292(b) certificate for permissive
appeal, the writs are best understood as a supplement to the interlocutory
appeal routes.2 75
Although writ practice is now rather arcane, 276 few situations regularly
recur in which the writ will issue: (1) when a jury trial has been denied
improperly; 277 (2) when an allegation of district court misconduct raises a
general procedural matter of first impression; 27 and, (3) when a district
court has acted improperly to remand a case previously removed from state
court. 279 The "last word" on the writs from the Supreme Court, however,
reemphasizes their extraordinary nature and portends an era of self-restrained
caution. 2 0
D. Appellate Sanctions
By statute and rule, reinforced by their inherent power, the courts of
appeals have jurisdiction to impose appropriate sanctions on those who
abuse the appellate process. 2s The law of sanctions is developing rapidly
and may best be described as uncertain. 2 2 Section 1927 of Title 28 provides
273. See 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3934 (1977); 9 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 110.28.
274. See FED. R. APP. P. 21(b) ("The order shall be served by the clerk on the judge or
judges named respondents and on all other parties to the action in the trial court .... If the
judge or judges named respondents do not desire to appear in the proceedings, they may so
advise the clerk and all parties by letter").
275. See supra Part IV(C).
276. See generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, § 3935 (1977); 9
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 110.28.
277. E.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1962) (court of appeals should
have granted petition for mandamus where district judge erred in refusing to grant demand for
trial by jury on factual issues related to breach of contract); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959) (holding that mandamus is available under the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651, to require a jury trial).
278. E.g., Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 109-12 (1964).
279. E.g., Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 352-53 (1976).
280. E.g., Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980) (per curiam); Will
v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 437 U.S. 655, 661-62 (1978) (holding that "[o]nly exceptional
circumstances, amounting to a judicial usurpation of power, will justify the invocation [of
mandamus]").
281. See FED. R. APP. P. 38. See generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note
41, at § 3984 (1977); 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 238.01-.02.
282. See e.g., G. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE (1988); W. FREEDMAN,
FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS AND FRIVOLOUS DEFENSES: UNJUSTIFIABLE LITIGATION §§ 1.3, 10.2 (1987).
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that any attorney who "multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably
and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess
costs, expenses and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct." 283 Section 1927 went largely ignored, prior to the recent fad for
sanctions, engendered in part by amendments to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11284 and by a virtual siege response to the federal docket crisis.2 185
Section 1927 is limited to attorneys but covers all cases and all proceedings
in federal court, including appeals.2 86 The circuits are split over whether
"unreasonably and vexatiously" requires subjective bad faith28 7 or only an
objective misconduct standard.2 88
Two other provisions are even broader. Federal Rule of Appellate Pro-
cedure 38, an echo of section 1912 of Title 28 authorizes "just damages,"
including attorneys' fees, and single or double costs upon a determination
that an "appeal is frivolous." 8 9 This determination is within the discretion
of the court of appeals. An appeal may be deemed frivolous when a result
is so inevitable and obvious as to be preordained or if the arguments raised
are wholly without merit. 290 The test is an objective standard and persons
In Section 1.3, Freedman discusses the frivolous appeal:
The definition of a frivolous appeal is a basic question that confronts the appellate
court which must look at the case itself to ascertain whether it is without merit and
has little chance to succeed, and then the court must look at the conduct of the
appellant to see whether he is dilatory, seeks to harass the court or the adversary,
or simply desires to mislead the court .... The merits of an appeal should be less
difficult to spot than a frivolous complaint, for the appeal is a claim that already
has undergone judicial scrutiny.
Id.
283. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982).
284. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (as amended Apr. 28, 1983, eff. Aug. 1, 1983; Mar. 2, 1987, eff.
Aug. 1, 1987).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38 and section 1927 are more pertinent to an examination
of the courts of appeals' decisions than is Rule 11 because the decision to levy sanctions under
Rule 11 is within the discretion of the trial court. Hirshman, Tough Love: The Courts of
Appeals Runs the Seventh Circuit the Old Fashioned Way, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 191, 199
(1987). See Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1510 (10th Cir. 1987) (Rule 11 allows "the
imposition of sanctions at the trial level, not on appeal"); Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985) (same).
285. See Joseph, Rule 11 is only the Beginning, 74 A.B.A. J. 62 (May 11, 1988).
286. See In re Ginther, 791 F.2d 1151, 1155-56 (5th Cir. 1986).
287. E.g., Ford v. Temple Hospital, 790 F.2d 342, 347-49 (3d Cir. 1986) (before attorneys'
fees and costs may be imposed under section 1927, there must be a finding of willful bad
faith).
288. E.g., Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 71-72 (7th Cir. 1986) (a court may and
should impose sanctions if a person "should have known" that his position is groundless);
Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that there is no necessary
subjective component to a proper analysis under Rule 11), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987).
289. FED. R. App. P. 38; 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1982) (minor differences in wording). See also
FED. R. App. P. 46(b) & (c) (power to suspend, disbar, and discipline attorneys); 16 FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3992 (1977).
290. See, e.g., Coglan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1988); Henry v. Farmer City State
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sanctionable include anyone who was responsible for prosecuting the frivo-
lous appeal: the parties, including pro se litigants and criminal defendants,
as well as their attorneys. 291 Sanctions can be imposed either sua sponte2 92
or on motion. Once deemed highly unusual and quite rare, appellate sanctions
seem to be becoming more common in the pages of the Federal Reporter,
2d Series. 293
Beyond rule and statute, there are somewhat questionable claims of a
federal court's residual inherent power to impose sanctions, such inherent
powers being part of the courts' power to control and manage their juris-
diction. 294 As with the inherent power to punish contempt, the courts of
appeals may be imbued with the inherent power to impose a variety of
sanctions independent of any rule or statute or limitations otherwise expressly
provided. These might conceivably include: attorneys' fees awards; 295 dis-
barment, 296 suspension, disqualification or reprimand of counsel; 297 dismissal
of an appeal; 29 or even withdrawal of a mandate obtained by a fraud on
the court.299 There are not many decisions based on this inherent power,
however, since the rule and statute have usually proven to be sufficient
sanctions.
Nevertheless, there seems to be a trend towards a greater willingness to
experiment with appellate sanctions.3 °° Multiple policy considerations con-
Bank, 808 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1986); Natasha, Inc. v. Evita Marine Charters, Inc., 763 F.2d
468 (1st Cir. 1985).
291. See Stelly v. Commissioner, 761 F.2d 1113, 1116 (5th Cir.) (persons sanctionable include
anyone responsible for filing the frivolous appeal), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 851 (1985) .
292. See, e.g., Devices for Medicine, Inc. v. Boehl, 822 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (attorney's
fees awarded sua sponte because appeal was frivolous and contributed to bad faith abuse of
judicial process); Brown v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 805 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1986) (court noted
that sanctions could have been imposed even if no motion had been made).
293. E.g., Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Natasha, Inc. v.
Evita Marine Charters, Inc., 763 F.2d 468, 471-73 (1st Cir. 1985). See generally Joseph, supra
note 285, at 62.
294. E.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (district court may
assess attorneys' fees in appropriate circumstances by invoking its inherent powers); Link v.
Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962) (affirmed district court's sua sponte dismissal of case
due to the attorney's failure to attend a pretrial conference as an appropriate exercise of the
court's inherent power to manage its own affairs). See generally Note, The Inherent Power:
An Obscure Doctrine Confronts Due Process, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 429 (1987) (discussing the
courts' exercise of inherent powers and possible alternatives).
295. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
296. Eash v. Riggins Truck, Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985).
297. Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193 (1lth Cir. 1985).
298. Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1987).
299. See Brocton Say. Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 771 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1985).
300. E.g., In re McDonald, 109 S. Ct. 993 (1989) (petitioner prohibited prospectively from
filing in forma pauperis requests for extraordinary writs in Supreme Court based on a history
of filing frivolous petitions); Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(pro se litigant enjoined from filing any civil action in any federal court without first obtaining
leave of the forum court).
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verge here. Access to appellate courts, while not ultimately of constitutional
dimension, is at least a statutory entitlement. But appeals brought only to
harass or to delay, impose severe economic costs on both litigants and
lawyers. Viewed systemically, frivolous appeals also divert scarce and judicial
resources and serve to debase the appellate currency. Guaranteeing and
policing appropriate methods and procedures for prosecuting appeals likewise
are necessary aspects of the judicial administration of the courts of appeals.
Consumers of judicial services, litigants and attorneys, are entitled to know
what standards will be applied, and courts are entitled to expect compliance
with those standards. What should be forthcoming from the judiciary,
however, are more and more clear guidelines.3 10
VI. APPEALS IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
A. Generally
Appeals in federal criminal matters bear a different emphasis and oblige
separate treatment in this Article. When brought by a criminal defendant,
an appeal generally must satisfy more closely the requirement of finality.
The liberalities of interpretation of the final decision requirement and the
various statutory accommodations found in civil appeals do not translate
well into the criminal appeal. When brought by the government, additional
special statutes must be satisfied, and there is a constitutional overlay of
double jeopardy restrictions. The differences summarized here are subdivided
by the identity of the appellant, either defendant or government.
B. Criminal Defendant Appeals
The especial importance of adhering to the final decision requirement in
criminal cases always has been emphasized:30 2
These considerations of [finality] policy are especially compelling in the
administration of criminal justice .... An accused is entitled to scrupulous
observance of constitutional safeguards. But encouragement of delay is
fatal to the vindication of the criminal law. Bearing the discomfiture and
cost of a prosecution for crime even by an innocent person is one of the
painful obligations of citizenship. The correctness of a trial court's rejection
even of a constitutional claim made by the accused in the process of
prosecution must await his conviction before its reconsideration by an
appellate tribunal3o3
301. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1987) (Pratt,
J., dissenting) (modern legal system has entered a new era of sanctions but lacks "an integrated
'code' of sanctions to supply coherent guidance").
302. See generally 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3918 (1976); 9
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 110.04-.05.
303. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). But see Houston v. Lack, 108
S. Ct. 2379 (1988) (notices of appeal by pro se prisoners considered filed upon delivery to
prison authorities). See generally Powell, Federal Jurisdiction in Criminal Appeals-Appealable
Orders in the Fifth Circuit, 19 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1003 (1988).
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With few statutory exceptions, the term "final decision" from section
1291 means imposition of the sentence in criminal matters.3 °4 However, it is
enough if the defendant is put on probation after sentence has been imposed
and suspended, or the imposition of sentence has been suspended. If a
sentence is imposed based on some counts but deferred on other counts,
there is no final judgment. A sentence entered after either a guilty plea or
a plea of nolo contendere is considered final, although the scope of review
may be limited to jurisdictional issues.
In detail too elaborate for replication here, the courts of appeals have
made several fine distinctions among and within categories of criminal trial
orders.3 °5 For example, orders related to grand jury proceedings sometimes
304. E.g., Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 518 (1956); United States v. Patterson, 882
F.2d 595, 599-600 (1st Cir. 1989) (government has no statutory basis for appeal of district
court's sentence in criminal case because sentencing is a key element of criminal prosecution
and "not in any sense independent of the main course . . . " therefore not a final order nor
does criminal collateral order doctrine apply), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3428 (1990); United
States v. Fisher, 871 F.2d 444, 449 (3d Cir. 1989) (district court's order denying defendants'
motions to dismiss indictment not final order, nor does it constitute exception as interlocutory
decision because does not satisfy third prong of test); United States v. Consiglio, 866 F.2d 310,
310-11 (9th Cir. 1989) (district court's denial of narcotics defendant's motion to compel release
of seized funds so defendant could retain counsel was not final order under section 1291, nor
was it appealable under collateral order exception); United States v. Slay, 858 F.2d 1310, 1313-
14 (8th Cir. 1988) (district court's modification of criminal indictment was interlocutory and
nonappealable); United States v. Midland Asphalt Corp., 840 F.2d 1040, 1046 (2d Cir. 1988)
(because order denying motion to dismiss indictment for alleged violation of FED. R. CRIM. P.
6(e) is likely to be appealable following trial, order not subject to interlocutory appellate review),
aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 1494 (1989); United States v. Bratcher, 833 F.2d 69, 72 (6th Cir. 1987) (order
denying defendant's motion to dismiss on basis of CRIM. R. 48(b) with prejudice and granting
motion to dismiss on basis of Speedy Trial Act without prejudice was not within Cohen
exception to final order doctrine and appeal dismissed), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1030 (1988);
United States v. Bird, 709 F.2d 388, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1983) (criminal defendant's claim that
interlocutory appeal seeking to enforce agreement by Assistant United States Attorney not to
prosecute was not final or collateral order exception and appeal dismissed); United States v.
Brizendine,659 F.2d 215, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (court lacked jurisdiction to review appeals by
defendants after district court denied motion to dismiss indictment on due process grounds
relating to plea bargaining process). Compare In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 873 F.2d 170, 173
(7th Cir. 1989) (order disqualifying government counsel in criminal case was final collateral
order immediately appealable under section 1291 because: 1) conclusively determines disputed
question; 2) resolves important issue completely separate from merits of underlying action; and,
3) is effectively unreviewable following trial); United States v. Smith, 851 F.2d 706, 708 (4th
Cir. 1988) (order denying defendant's motion to dismiss indictment was appealable under
exception to final decision requirement where order granted government's motion to try defen-
dant as adult even though he was fifteen years old at time of actual crime); United States v.
C.G., 736 F.2d 1474, 1476-77 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (district court's order denying juvenile defendant's
motion to strike certification and granting government's motion to transfer was appealable
collateral order). See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (Supp. IV 1986) (broadening review of sentences
imposed under federal sentencing guidelines). See also Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct.
647 (1989) (upholding scheme of federal sentencing guidelines).
305. These distinctions most often are made under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen
v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949). Although Cohen was a civil case, the
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are and sometimes are not deemed final. A denial of a motion to dismiss
an indictment usually is not final, nor are orders related to a bill of
particulars. 306 Orders granting or denying discovery are ordinarily not final
and appealable, unless they are not part of a continuing pretrial proceeding.
For the most part, denials of motions to suppress evidence are not final.30 7
If deemed separable, an order restraining a defendant's property pending
trial may be deemed appealable.3 °0 Denial of a motion for a speedy trial
ordinarily is not final.3s 9 These and sundry other orders at criminal trials
disposing of pretrial, trial and post trial motions "may present puzzling
questions" 3 10 and therefore require independent assessment against precedent
and the policy of finality.
Interlocutory appeals in criminal matters likewise are more restrictive than
on the civil side. The most general and commonly used statutes for inter-
locutory appeals in civil matters simply do not apply. For example, section
1292(a) entitled interlocutory appeals,3 ' and section 1292(b) permissive in-
terlocutory appeals,312 are expressly limited to civil actions. The jurisdiction
to issue extraordinary writs applies in criminal and civil matters, although
the restricted attitude toward the writs is exaggerated further by the height-
ened importance afforded the final decision requirement on the criminal
side.313
Aside from the collateral orders sometimes judicially treated as final and
mentioned already, other matters are provided an interlocutory appeal by
specific statute. The Bail Reform Act of 1984314 creates the most significant
statutory exception to this regime of finality." ' Appeals from a release or
detention order or from an order denying revocation or amendment of such
an order must satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 1291 finality, if brought by an accused,
collateral order doctrine also applies to criminal cases. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309
U.S. 323, 328-29 (1940). See generally 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at
§ 3918 (1976); 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 110.05, .13[3] & .13111].
306. E.g., Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 327-28; In re Grand Jury Matter, 802 F.2d 96, 98 (3d
Cir. 1986); United States v. Martin, 682 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1982). But see United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690-92 (1974) (the President may appeal motion to dismiss subpoena
duces tecum immediately, due to separation of powers issue).
307. DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 131 (1969).
308. Id. at 131-32.
309. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 858-61 (1978).
310. 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3918 (Supp. 1989).
311. See supra Part IV(B).
312. See supra Part IV(C).
313. E.g., Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96 (1967). See generally Note, Time is of the
Essence: The Case for Amending 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to Permit Interlocutory Appeals in
Criminal Cases, 1989 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 727.
314. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3145 (Supp. II. 1984). See also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1951)
(proper procedure for challenging unlawfully fixed bail).
315. See also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (motion to reduce bail appealable);
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1951) (same).
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or the restrictions on government appeals, if brought by the prosecution. 16
The new scheme permits a defendant to appeal only after the order to detain
pending trial, or the conditions imposed on an order to release, have been
passed on by the district court.117
Last mentioned is the constitutional possibility for interlocutory appeal
under the former jeopardy provision. Unlike other motions with constitu-
tional overtones, such as motions to suppress or motions for a speedy trial,318
the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment for former jeopardy is
subject to interlocutory appeal. 19 As with other interlocutory appeals, the
district court must fully decide the question; and the matter itself must be
separable from the issue on the merits, and former jeopardy is separate from
guilt or innocence. The substantive right here informs the procedure; because
the right is not to be subjected to a second trial, only an interlocutory appeal
can protect it. a20 This notion of a constitutionally-based interlocutory appeal
has not been extended to other rights.3 21
C. Government Appeals
The government has no right to appeal in federal criminal cases unless
the appeal is expressly authorized by statute. 22 Furthermore, statutory au-
thorization must comport with the fifth amendment former jeopardy pro-
tection. Furthermore, any interlocutory government appeal must not unduly
postpone the proceeding sufficiently to violate the defendant's constitutional
and statutory right to a speedy trial. For the most part, however, the
government does not generally rely on the jurisdictional provision over final
judgments in section 1291 .33 Rather, section 3731 of Title 18 is the basic
316. See also 18 U.S.C. § 4208(b) (1982); Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169, 173-74
(1963) (alternate appeals allowed upon indeterminate commitment to develop information for
sentence).
317. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) (Supp. IV 1986). See infra Part VI(C). See also FED. R. APP. P.
9(b) (court of appeals or circuit judge may authorize bail pending appeal, although application
should first be made in district court).
318. DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1962).
319. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 853-56 (1978).
320. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656-62 (1977). See also Richardson v. United
States, 468 U.S. 317, 326 n.6 (1984) (extension to improper mistrials); cf. Helstoski v. Meanor,
442 U.S. 500, 505-08 (1979) (denial of motion to dismiss based on speech or debate clause held
appealable); United States v. Murphy, 642 F.2d 699, 700 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (same).
But see United States v. Dunbar, 611 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (frivolous claim does
not divest district court of jurisdiction, but court should make written finding when denying
claim), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 926 (1980).
321. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974).
322. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 82 F.2d 595, 596 (1st Cir. 1989) (government did
not have right to appeal district court's sentence in case where district court held that defendant's
prior convictions did not qualify as predicate offense for sentence enhancement), cert. denied,
58 U.S.L.W. 3428 (1990). See generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41,
at § 3919 (1977); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 110.04, .19[7].
323. Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 400 (1957). But see Arizona v. Manypenny, 451
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authorizing statute.3 24 Appeals are authorized from three separate categories
of orders: (1) a final order dismissing an indictment or information or
granting a new trial after verdict or judgment on any one or more counts-
unless the former jeopardy clause prohibits further prosecution;3 25 (2) an
interlocutory order suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the return
of property;3 26 and, (3) an interlocutory order granting the release of the
U.S. 232, 241-50 (1981) (appeal by state from adverse judgment when criminal proceeding
removed to federal court); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253, 2255 (1982) (section 1291 applies in proceedings
to vacate sentence). See generally 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at §
3919 (1976).
324. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (Supp. IV 1986). See also supra Part V(C) (government may petition
for extraordinary relief).
325. E.g., United States v. Spilotro, 884 F.2d 1003, 1005-06 (7th Cir. 1989) (dismissed
government appeal of district court's order reducing defendant's sentence because no jurisdiction
under either sections 3731 or 1291); United States v. Patterson, 882 F.2d 595, 597-99 (1st Cir.
1989) (government had no authorization to appeal district court's sentence where district court
held that defendant's prior convictions did not qualify as predicate offenses for sentence
enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); however appellate court reversed under mandamus
authority), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3428 (1990); United States v. Hundley, 858 F.2d 58, 59
(2d Cir. 1988) (government's appeal from order granting defendant's motion to set aside fifteen
year sentence was dismissed because what in form was appeal from granting of motion under
section 2255 was in substance an unauthorized appeal by government from five year sentence);
United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643, 646 (3d Cir. 1986) (double jeopardy clause presented no
bar to court's review of district court's order vacating convictions entered by magistrate); United
States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1308-11 (11th Cir. 1985) (double jeopardy clause did not
bar appellate court's jurisdiction over government's appeal from final judgment of acquittal of
defendant entered upon retrial); United States v. Ember, 726 F.2d 522, 523-25 (9th Cir. 1984)
(appeal from district court's judgment of acquittal barred by double jeopardy clause because
reversal would necessitate second trial); United States v. Harshaw, 705 F.2d 317, 319-20 (8th
Cir. 1983) (section 3731 authorizes government appeal from order granting defendant's motion
for mistrial and double jeopardy clause no bar because trial was terminated at defendant's
request); United States v. Singleton, 702 F.2d 1159, 1161-62 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (post-verdict
judgments of acquittal based on insufficiency of evidence may be appealed under 18 U.S.C. §
3731, and double jeopardy clause was no bar to appeal because reversal would not require new
trial); United States v. Rothfelder, 474 F.2d 606, 608 (6th Cir. 1973) (government appeal of
district court's dismissal of indictment not authorized under section 3731 where district court
based dismissal on extraneous facts so that its judgment operated as acquittal), cert. denied,
413 U.S. 922 (1973).
326. E.g., United States v. Bouthot, 878 F.2d 1506, 1510 (1st Cir. 1989) (under section 3731,
government was entitled to appeal district court's order granting motion to suppress evidence
because evidence was "substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding"); United States
v. Eccles, 850 F.2d 1357, 1359-60 (9th Cir. 1988) (government's appeal from order granting in
part and denying in part defendant's motion to suppress evidence was authorized under section
1331; delayed filing of section 3731 certificate did not destroy appellate jurisdiction but in
future court warned it would not tolerate tardiness); United States v. Kepner, 843 F.2d 755,
760-61 (3d Cir. 1988) (government not estopped from raising appeal of order suppressing
evidence after it stated it would not do so, where orders to suppress evidence were made before
defendants were put in jeopardy and before verdict was rendered in indictment); United States
v. Kington, 801 F.2d 733, 736 (5th Cir. 1986) (government entitled to appeal of order suppressing
evidence after jury was empaneled and sworn in case where judge later ended trial by discharging
jury on condition that defendant agree to waive double jeopardy claims); United States v.
TO WARD A UNIFIED THEORY
defendant, before or after conviction, or denying the government's motion
to revoke or to modify the conditions of release.
The first category, with its incorporation by reference, is essentially short-
hand for the former jeopardy protection in the fifth amendment. Although
section 1291 is not the jurisdictional basis, that finality test is the first
criterion for these appeals under section 3731, with few specifically identified
statutory exceptions. Double jeopardy principles 327 prohibit the government
from taking an appeal from a not guilty verdict and, further, prevent the
government from relitigating any issue that directly informed that verdict.
Appeals are permitted from orders entered before jeopardy attaches which
occurs when the jury is sworn or when the first witness is sworn in a bench
trial. Once jeopardy has attached, any acquittal on the merits will bar retrial
and hence an appeal. If a jury returns a verdict, there is no right of
government appeal if the verdict acquits the defendant, but an appeal may
be taken if the jury convicts and the judge thereafter absolves the defendant.
The statutory intent is understood to mean to permit all government appeals
within the judicial limner of the constitutional limit. An appeal by the
government does not allow the defendant, by cross-appeal, to raise issues
beyond those related to a judgment of dismissal.3 2 Beyond these basic rules,
however, the decisional law on double jeopardy and government appeals is
currently in a state of flux.3 29
The second category in section 3731, appeals from orders suppressing or
excluding evidence or requiring the return of property, is designed to permit
a government appeal of an order that as a practical matter eliminates the
prosecution's case. Otherwise, an acquittal could result from an improvident
suppression. Although appeals under this provision are liberally allowed,-this
Posner, 764 F.2d 1535, 1538 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (section 3731 entitled government to appeal district
court's order excluding evidence entered before retrial, because defendant filed motion granting
severance), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986); United States v. Shears, 762 F.2d 397, 400 (4th
Cir. 1985) (where defendant himself moved for mistrial and specifically waived any double
jeopardy claim, court of appeals had jurisdiction over government appeal of district court's
suppression order).
327. See generally W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 47, at §§ 24.1-24.5 (1985).
328. See supra Part II(C).
329. See, e.g., Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978) (double jeopardy a bar to
multiple prosecutions of different elements of same offense); Finch v. United States, 433 U.S.
676 (1977) (double jeopardy a bar to appeal of an information dismissed for failure to state
offense); Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977) (petitioner's retrial after dismissal of defective
information at his request not violation of double jeopardy clause); United States v. Martin
Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (double jeopardy a bar to appellate review and retrial
following acquittal under Rule 29(c)); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975) (no double
jeopardy bar to appeal by United States from pre-trial order dismissing indictment); United
States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975) (double jeopardy a bar to further proceedings after
acquittal), overruled in part, United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 95-101 (1978) (no double
jeopardy bar to appeal where defendant successfully terminated trial prior to submission to
judge or jury as to guilt or innocence); United States v. Wilson 420 U.S. 332 (1975) (no double
jeopardy bar to appeal if judge rules for defendant after guilty verdict entered).
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is to be contrasted with the general rule that denials of a defendant's motion
to suppress are not appealable.3 0 Upon filing the required certificate of good
faith and importance, the government may appeal the suppression of evidence
based on the exclusionary rule or any other reason.3 '
The third category in section 3731, the bail appeal provision, must be read
together with The Bail Reform Act of 1984, section 3742 of Title 18.332 These
statutes together provide for plenary review of bail decisions adverse to the
government. The particular procedures to be followed and the standards to
be applied, however, are beyond the scope of this Article.
Finally, beyond section 3731, the government's right to appellate review
of sentences was broadened in 1984, along with the defendant's, by statute. 333
Section 3742 of Title 18 authorizes the government to appeal, in terms
parallel to the defendant's authorization, if a sentence is imposed in violation
of the law, or resulted from an incorrect application of the federal sentencing
guidelines, or violated the terms of a plea agreement.33 4
VII. APPEALS IN ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS
A. Generally
The courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review administrative actions
of dozens of federal agencies, boards, and even individual government
officials. These reviews account for upwards of ten percent of the federal
appellate docket. The substantive law and procedural rules are adjectival to
the subject of administrative law and this Article must therefore defer to
treatises on that larger subject."3 5
Judicial review of administrative agency action may take the form of
"nonstatutory" review by suit against the officer or agency in the district
court under some general heading of subject matter jurisdiction with an
appeal to the court of appeals.3 6 With the growth of the modern adminis-
330. See supra Part VI(B).
331. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(b) (1982) (interlocutory appeal of suppression orders in
wiretaps); 18 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West Supp. 1985) (interlocutory appeal under Classified Information
Procedures Act).
332. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3148 (1982).
333. See supra note 303.
334. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) (Supp. IV 1986). See Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647
(1989) (upholding scheme of sentencing guidelines).
335. See Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363
(1986). See generally 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 23.1-23.22 (2d ed. 1983);
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION ACTION (1965).
336. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 703 (1982). These "nonstatutory" actions may include actions for
declaratory judgments, writs of mandamus or habeas corpus. Id. Other forms of action which
may be allowed include, but are not limited to, tort suits against government officers and suits
brought under the doctrine of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See K. DAvIS, supra note 335, at § 23:1; see generally 14
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3655 (2d ed. 1985); 3A J. MOORE, J.
LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE .6512.-1] (1989).
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trative state, however, Congress has experimented with two other review
models. Some statutes authorize a priority suit to enjoin an agency order
before a three-judge district court, with direct appeal as of right to the
Supreme Court. This model has fallen from favor, however, for many of
the reasons that the three-judge court has come to be considered somewhat
anachronistic, although there are still a few statutes which follow this
procedure.337 Beginning with the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914,338
Congress authorized an exclusive jurisdiction in the (then-circuit) courts of
appeals to affirm, enforce, modify, or set-aside orders of the agency, with
a subsequent discretionary review in the Supreme Court. Since 1950, this
latter review model has been preferred and has become dominant. 3 9
In the prevailing review model, the agency performs as a trial court through
an administrative law judge who hears evidence, develops a record, and
makes the initial decision on issues of law and fact. Most commonly, there
is a subsequent intra-agency appeal before some agency review panel. Judicial
review in the court of appeals thereafter deals, for the most part, with
questions of law or reviews the record for substantiality of the evidence.
Numerous statutes provide for review in the courts of appeals, sometimes
exclusively in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and a
treatise disclaimer applies more intently to this Article: "Complete enumer-
ation of the statutes would be too lengthy to serve any useful purpose, even
if it were possible to be confident that a complete list could be prepared." 3 °
Issues on appeal might range from a claim for individual compensation
under a government entitlement program to an environmental issue with
national impact. Statutes either expressly require that rules be adopted by
an order made reviewable or simply provide for judicial review of all orders.
Courts seem to vacillate between polar approaches, one approach seems to
be preoccupied with procedural and jurisdictional matters and the other
approach seems to be characterized by a zeal to reach and to resolve the
merits.3 4' For example, the answer varies from statute to statute and differs
from circuit to circuit as to whether a statutory authorization to review
administrative "orders" does include judicial review of agency rules and
regulations.
The notion of limited jurisdiction is important in understanding judicial
review of administrative agency decisions.342 As interpreted, the judicial
review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act do not confer juris-
337. See Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-584, 88 Stat. 1917 (orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission made reviewable by court of appeals). Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1336(a)
(1982) (district court review of orders to pay) with §§ 2321-2323, 2342(5) (1982) (court of
appeals review of all other orders). See also supra Part I(E).
338. Act of September 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 720 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
45(c) (1982)).
339. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2351 (1982). See also Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of
Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1975).
340. 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3941 (1977).
341. See K. DAVIS, supra note 335, at § 23.2.
342. See supra Part I(C).
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diction, 343 but only prescribe procedures when a court of appeals is granted
review power by some other statute.3 44
The procedure for transferring an administrative appeal from one court
of appeals to another depends on section 2112(a) of Title 28,341 and a seldom
invoked but recognized additional, inherent power.3 46 Typically, a need for
the transfer mechanism arises when multiple petitions for review of a single
administrative order are filed in different circuits. 47 Multiple filings are made
possible by alternative grants of jurisdiction to review in more than one
circuit. For example, a statute might authorize a person aggrieved by an
order to file a petition for review wherever the person resides or does business,
or where the regulated activity took place, or in the District of Columbia.
Different parties affected by the order may prefer review in different circuits,
and the so-called "race to the courthouse" is on. Under the old first-to-file
rule of jurisdiction, differences of minutes often controlled. Congress recently
responded to the waste of judicial resources in multiple filings and in
prolonged proceedings for transfer in such situations to create simple and
clear "rules of the road." Under the new statute, if two or more petitions
for review are filed in two or more courts of appeals within 10 days of the
administrative order, then the matter is referred to the judicial panel on
multidistrict litigation which will assign the petitions randomly to one of the
courts in which a petition was filed.3 4 The panel on multidistrict litigation
has, in turn, proposed rules of procedure, not adopted as of the time of
this writing, to handle multiple filings.3 49
B. Finality and Exclusivity
Some of the myriad of statutes providing for court of appeals review
explicitly require a "final order"350 while others have been interpreted to
impliedly require finality.35 As the final decision requirement serves to order
343. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982). See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977). In
Califano, the Court found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether the Administrative
Procedure Act constituted an independent grant of jurisdiction because Congress had recently
removed the jurisdictional amount requirement from federal question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331. Id.
344. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2351 (1982) (orders of specified agencies subject to review
in the courts of appeals).
345. 28 U.S.C. § 1221(a) (1982).
346. See supra Part V(D) (inherent power to sanction). See also supra Part II(G) (transfers
for want of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1631).
347. See generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3944 (1977); 9
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, at 0.146[10].
348. Selection of Court for Multiple Appeals, Pub. L. No. 100-236, §§ 1, 3, 101 Stat. 1731,
1732 (to be codified as amended 28 U.S.C. 2112(a)).
349. Proposed Rules for Multicircuit Petitions for Review under 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3)
(found at 840 F.2d No. 2, at ci-cxvii (Mar. 31, 1988)). See also supra Part II(E).
350. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1982).
351. E.g., Federal Power Comm. v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375, 384 (1938)
(provision of Federal Power Act "relates to orders of a definitive character").
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the relationship of appellate court with the trial court, the final administrative
order requirement does the same for both appellate court and agency.352 On
the administrative side, finality is related to the doctrine that requires the
exhaustion of administrative remedies.353 The party seeking judicial review,
generally, must pursue administrative remedies provided for by statute or
agency rule. And most agency review statutes preclude consideration of
matters not first raised before the agency, although the failure may be
excused on a proper showing.354 Nevertheless, finality is something of an
empty vessel to be given content by the courts.
In administrative matters, the Supreme Court has cautioned "the core
principle that statutorily created finality requirements should, if possible, be
construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost and potentially
irreparable injuries to be suffered remains applicable." '355 The finality re-
quirement is to be applied "pragmatically . . . focusing on whether judicial
review at the time will disrupt the administrative process. 356 The requirement
is treated as jurisdictional and these purposes are reflected in applications. 517
The interplay of the need for present judicial review and the finality concept
is manifested again in a small but growing number of decisions allowing
interlocutory review of agency action through the extraordinary writs.358
These decisions build on the unremarkable use of mandamus against an
agency ignoring the mandate of a court of appeals after review.
The principle of exclusivity is distinct from that of finality.3 59 The particular
statute providing for judicial review of an agency order may provide explicitly
that the jurisdiction of the court of appeals is exclusive; or district court
review of matters within that jurisdiction may be precluded by implication. 36°
Of course, if the particular matter does not come within the grant of appellate
352. See generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3942 (1977).
353. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
354. Compare EEOC v. FLRA, 476 U.S. 19, 22-23 (1986) (claim not previously urged before
NLRB barred by court) with McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969) (failure
excused because administrative process had ended and party faced criminal prosecution).
355. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.ll (1976).
356. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 779 (1983), citing FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S.
232, 239 (1980); Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assoc. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic,
400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970); see also Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
357. In fact, courts will raise the issue themselves, even if the parties fail to do so. 16
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3942 (1977). E.g., FTC v. Standard Oil
Co., 449 U.S. 232, 246 (1980).
358. See supra Part V(C).
359. See FTC v. Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 243; see generally 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, supra note 41, at § 3943 (1977) (appellate review is exclusive method of review of
administrative decisions); 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 24.06[3.-
31 (1987) (discussing judicial review of agency orders).
360. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(d) (1982) (explicit); Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New
Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411, 422 (1965) (where Congress has enacted a specific statutory
scheme of judicial review by specific appellate courts, doctrine of exhaustion requires exclusive
adherence to that scheme).
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jurisdiction, then the exclusivity principle cannot apply to preempt district
court review.3 61 Additionally, exclusivity may be excused to allow immediate
district court review of a matter that eventually would be reviewable in the
court of appeals upon a demonstration akin to the showing required for
injunctive relief: if the right being asserted is clear and important, especially
if it is a constitutional right, and the harm will be irreparable if consideration
is postponed until later review in the court of appeals. This possibility is a
rare but noteworthy exception to the general exclusivity principle.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The ultimate two concerns behind the various principles of appellate
jurisdiction are clarity and capacity. A final concept of closure might also
be noted.
Clarity in these principles minimizes the undesirable, though inevitable,
litigation over jurisdiction, thus furthering efficiency in the court system.
For most questions in most appeals today, the issue of jurisdiction is readily
apparent. The rules as stated appear to be clear enough, although their
application may be somewhat sophisticated and complex. In those few
remaining appeals in which the power to hear an appeal is uncertain, the
lack of clarity over appellate jurisdiction may be attributed to a purposeful
pragmatism that has characterized the courts in their administration of the
jurisdictional rules-an effort, in short, to avoid automatic or extreme
approaches. Therefore, it might be suggested that some of the uncertainty
in the theory is by design.
As for capacity, the concern is to define appellate jurisdiction to keep
appellate caseloads manageable. Statutory and decisional policies relating to
appellate jurisdiction have not contributed appreciably to the current docket
crisis at the courts of appeals, but that is a small comfort. Congress has
failed to keep judicial capacity in line with caseload demands. Since 1960,
circuit judgeships have more than doubled, yet the number of annual appeals
filed has increased nearly by a factor of ten. Such considerations, however,
go beyond the focus of an article on appellate jurisdiction. 62
Viewed most broadly and cumulatively, the various statutes and case
decisions on appealability structure a relationship between the reviewing
court and the court being reviewed. In this relationship, everything is re-
viewable, in its own way and at its own time. Every order that a district
court enters or fails to enter may be reviewed. This may be described as the
concept of "closure" in federal appellate jurisdiction. The various sections
361. Cf. FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1984) (interpreting
scope of exclusive jurisdiction).
362. See generally Baker, A Compendium of Proposals to Reform the United States Courts
of Appeals, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 225 (1985). See generally P. Carrington, Civil Appellate
Jurisdiction (pts. I & 2), 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1-248, 1-179 (1984) (Part I, in form, a
restatement; Part 11 provides comparative perspective).
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of this Article are cumulative; the different bases for appellate review are
best considered aggregately and alternatively. The appropriate methodology
is to go down the outline like a checklist to determine if there is one or
more basis for appellate review either now or later.
The Supreme Court itself has warned: "No verbal formula yet devised
can explain prior [appellate jurisdiction] ... decisions with unerring accuracy
or provide an utterly reliable guide for the future. 3 63 The challenge then
for the theorist-practitioner of appellate jurisdiction is to know "when" and
"how" and to try to understand "why." Such an understanding takes us a
step closer toward a unified theory of the jurisdiction of the United States
Courts of Appeals.
363. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974).

